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1. Some sexual violence during conflicts is committed against boys and men, but
the overwhelming majority of this violence is committed against women and girls. See
Kelly D. Askin, Prosecuting Wartime Rape and Other Gender-Related Crimes Under
International Law: Extraordinary Advances, Enduring Obstacles, 21 BERKELEY J. INT ’L
L. 288, 297 (2003) (indicating that “outside a domestic prison context, targets of sex
crimes are overwhelmingly female”).
2. See, e.g., Hilary Charlesworth, Feminist Methods in International Law, 93 AM .
J. INT ’L L. 379, 385 (1999). Apart from sexualized violence, women also suffer greater
injuries and death from landmines in conflict as they tend to constitute the majority of
internally displaced persons (IDPs). See Judith Gardam & Michelle Jarvis, Women and
Armed Conflict: The International Response to the Beijing Platform for Action, 32
COLUM. HUM . RTS. L. REV. 1, 12 (2000). (“The presence of landmines, also hinders the
return of refugees, a factor that is most likely to affect women and children, who
constitute the majority of the world’s refugee population.”).
3. See id.
4. See, e.g., id.
5. See, e.g., DONNA PANKHURST , CTR. FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION, DEP ’T OF PEACE
STUDIES, UNIV . OF BRADFORD, WOMEN , GENDER AND PEACEBUILDING 9 (2000), available
at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/confres/assets/CCR5.pdf (describing “a need for
peacebuilding to incorporate policies which address women’s specific health and
economic needs”); UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, GENDER APPROACHES IN CONFLICT
AND POST-CONFLICT SITUATIONS 11 (2003) (acknowledging that the post-conflict phase
presents “an opportunity to promote reconstruction efforts with a gender perspective”).
6. The United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) has defined the
concept of gender mainstreaming as follows:
In any area and at all levels, a gender mainstreaming perspective is the
process of assessing the implications for women and men in any planned
action, including legislation, policies or programmes. It is a strategy for
making the concerns and experiences of women as well as of men an
integral part of design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of
policies and programmes in all political, economic and social spheres, so
that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated. The
INTRODUCTION
Armed conflicts affect both men and women, but women face
additional issues during wars that men do not, including sexual
violence,1 forced impregnation, and forced abortion.2 Women are
also differentially affected because of their role as the primary
caretaker of the household and family, as well as their second class
status in most conflict zones.3 Once the conflict ends, women
continue to experience the consequences of these actions.4
In discussing women and war, this article addresses gender
and post conflict reconstruction. Scholars, human rights organiza-
tions, and other local, national, and international actors have
considered the importance of integrating women’s wartime
experiences in the post conflict context.5 These scholars and
organizations have developed useful programs, such as gender
mainstreaming,6 to ensure the inclusion of women’s experiences and
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ultimate goal of mainstreaming is to achieve gender equality.
U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Coordination of Policies and Activities of the
Specialized Agencies and Other Bodies of the United Nations System Related to the
Following Theme: Mainstreaming the Gender Perspective into All Policies and
Programmes in the United Nations System, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. E/1997/l.30 (July 14, 1997).
7. See Gardam & Jarvis, supra note 2, at 39-42 (describing the increased presence
of female combatants). In some intra-state conflicts, female combatants are actually
considered more effective than their male counterparts. See, e.g., Liberia’s Women
Killers, BBC NE W S, Aug. 26, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3181529.stm
(quoting Peter Coleman, Liberia’s Health Minister, who argues that women “are prized
by their senior commanders as ‘[t]hey don’t get drunk and they take their mission very
seriously’”).
8. See, e.g., George Bardue, ‘We Were Forced to Fight’ Female Ex-Combatants
Explain, ALLAFRICA.COM , Feb. 23, 2004, available at http://www.peacewomen.org/news/
Liberia/Feb04/excombatants.html.
9. VANESSA FARR, BONN INT ’L CTR. FOR CONVERSION, GENDERING DEM ILITARIZATION
AS A PEACEBUILDING TOOL 6 (2002); MATT HOBSON, SAVE THE CHILDREN, FORGOTTEN
CASUALTIES OF WAR: GIRLS  IN ARMED CONFLICT 1 (2005), available at http://www.save
thechildren.org.uk/temp/scuk/cache/cmsattach/2698_GAAF%20report.pdf.
10. HOBSON, supra note 9, at 4.
11. Some women may choose to follow a male relative who is fighting. Other women
may “voluntarily” participate in conflict out of sheer survival, as doing so is “the best
chance they will have to get food and other material goods.” Id. at 11.
12. Id. at 4.
13. Id. at 6 (quoting Furaa, a Congolese girl who fought with an unarmed group in
the DRC as explaining, “when the men [in the interhamwe] were pillaging people’s
villages, they would rape women”).
14. See, e.g., Gardam & Jarvis, supra note 2, at 29-38.
voices. Although gender mainstreaming is one useful program, this
article argues for reform of the post-conflict context so that
neglected experiences become central, not merely mainstreamed.
Women are most likely to experience conflict as civilians,
although they may be combatants as well.7 Women fight alongside
men, both willingly and unwillingly,8 and as many as forty percent
of all child soldiers are girls.9 In addition to combat roles, women
and girls may act as health professionals, provide domestic labor
and sexual services, or assist in the essential task of collecting
information.10 Although such service may be voluntary,11 most
women are coerced into joining armed groups.12 Even those women
who are allowed to remain in their communities during conflict may
become victims of economic pillaging and sexual violence.13 The
impact of conflict on women ranges from their mental and physical,
including reproductive, health, to economic survival, to the
breakdown of their families and communities.14
Nonetheless, women may also benefit from war, not just
through economic profiteering as businesspeople, but also through
the “gender dividend,” which allows them to function in roles
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15. Id. at 42-43 (indicating that war can be a time of empowerment for women as
they are often required to perform traditionally male roles and in so doing, develop new
skills). For an account of the role of women in the labor force during World War II, see
PENNY COLMAN , ROSIE  THE RIVETER: WOMEN WORKING ON THE HOME FRONT IN WORLD
WAR II (1995); SHERNA BERGER GLUCK, ROSIE THE RIVETER REVISITED: WOMAN , THE
WAR, AND SOCIAL CHANGE (1987).
16. See, e.g., TSJEARD BOUTA ET AL., THE WORLD BANK, GENDER, CONFLICT, AND
DEVELOPMENT xx (2005) (noting that among women who voluntarily choose to serve as
soldiers, a key motivation is to obtain rights and gender equality).
17. See, e.g., Elaine Zuckerman & Marcia Greenberg, The Gender Dimensions of
Post-Conflict Reconstruction: An Analytical Framework for Policymakers, 12 GENDER
& DEV. 1 (2004), available at http://www.genderaction.org/images/ez-mg%20oxfam%
20g&d%20gender-pcr.pdf.
18. See MARTHA HIRPA, HEIFER INT ’L, GENDER EQUITY: EMPHASIZING FULL
PARTICIPATION, available at http://www.heifer.org/site/c.edJRKQNiFiG/b.485979/ (last
visited Dec. 30, 2005) (“Addressing gender issues is crucial to sustainable development.
Development — improving people’s livelihoods — isn’t sustainable unless both men and
women participate, unless both take responsibility for their futures.”).
19. Professor Ruti Teitel has defined transitional justice as “the conception of justice
associated with periods of political change, characterized by legal responses to confront
the wrongdoings of repressive predecessor regimes.” Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice
Genealogy, 16 HARV. HUM . RTS. J. 69, 69 (2003).
20. See generally ROGER DUTH IE, ST OC K HO LM  INITIATIVE ON DISARMAMENT
DEMOBILISATION REINTEGRATION (SIDDR), TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND SOCIAL
traditionally occupied by men.15 Women may perform non-tradi-
tional roles both within their communities and in the conflict itself,
acquiring new skills and status as a result.16
Following the conflict, the country, civil actors, international
donors, and multilateral institutions must address the myriad of
roles that women have experienced during the conflict. The
involvement of women in post conflict reconstruction is, of course,
an enormous topic, that ranges from the demilitarization process to
the institution of a new government.17 Yet, integrating gender in
the post conflict process specifically includes: (1) proceeding upon
the recognition that sustainable development requires gender
equity;18 (2) recognizing women’s rights to participate in all aspects
of the transition; (3) developing laws that respect and foster gender
equity; and (4) implementing a justice component which ends
impunity and ensures accountability for crimes committed during
the conflict against women and girls.
Reconstruction includes many forms of development-related
assistance, however, it must include a justice component. As
warring groups reconcile, questions of responsibility remain. The
relationship between transitional justice19 and reconstruction is
complex; when ex-combatants seek to return to their communities,
they must also confront issues of culpability for crimes committed
during war.20 Moreover, as victims attempt to continue with their
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REINTEGRATION (2005), available at http://www.sweden.gov.se/content/1/c6/04/39/68/
77a5e773.pdf.
21. “Social services justice” provides another dimension to concepts of justice by
focusing on the social, economic, medical, and psychological components of providing
justice to victims. See Naomi Cahn, Beyond Retribution and Impunity: Responding to
War Crimes of Sexual Violence, 1 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 217, 247-49 (2005).
22. Ruti Teitel, Respondent: The Future of Human Rights Discourse, 46 ST. LOU IS
U. L.J. 449, 449 (2002).
23. For an explanation of DDR, see infra note 62, and accompanying text.
24. This shows the perpetrator that the crime was committed against society,
thereby relieving pressure on the victim. See C. Quince Hopkins et al., Responding: Two
New Solutions: Applying Restorative Justice to Ongoing Intimate Violence: Problems
and Possibilities, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 289, 290 (2004) (“[A]s witnesses rather
than parties in criminal cases, victims’ control over prosecution is limited; in fact, the
traditional criminal justice system, at the urging of battered women’s advocates,
affirmatively displaces battered women . . . in a noble effort to take on the primary
responsibility of confronting batterers about their violence.”); see also Nancy
Rosenblum, Justice and the Experience of Injustice, in BREAKING THE CYCLES OF
HATRED: MEMORY , LAW , AND REPA IR 88 (Nancy Rosenblum, ed. 2002) (“As important as
they are, legal proceedings in response to human rights violations have as their goal
justice and not assistance to the aggrieved.”).
25. Truth commissions are one tool for accomplishing this goal. In a thoughtful
article on transitional justice, Judy Meltzer delineates five ways in which truth
commissions, as distinct from formal prosecutions, contribute to reconciliation:
They create a public space for victims to be heard and acknowledged; They
allow for collective and institutional responsibility, unlike formal legal
processes that are restricted to the individual; They can contribute directly
to legal judicial procedures or make prosecution more likely in the future;
They offer an opportunity to make recommendations regarding the
reconciliation processes including reparations and institutional reforms, as
lives, they too must confront the impact of the conflict-based
violence. To encompass the complexity of this situation, this article
suggests that there are three distinct concepts of justice in this
context: criminal/civil justice, restorative justice, and social services
justice.21 Each of these is implicated in post conflict reconstruction.
Transitional justice, which focuses on responding to past
human rights violations, can hold violators accountable for their
acts.22 But a critical issue for post conflict reconstruction is moving
beyond criminal prosecutions that ensure accountability of perpe-
trators toward a system that also serves the needs of victims. When
reconstruction includes disarmament, demobilization, and reinte-
gration (DDR)23 and “development” services, these programs cannot
be separated from perpetrator responsibility. The traditional
criminal justice is perpetrator-centric. Indeed, under the criminal
justice system, the victim is not a party to the proceedings but is
merely called as a witness by the prosecution, who represents the
public interest.24 Alternative forms of justice have broadened this
focus, recognizing that the legal system must respond to both
victims and perpetrators.25
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well as putting in place funding structures required. . . .; [and t]hey
establish a shared understanding of the past, which is important for
reconciliation.
Judy Meltzer, Transitional Justice and Reconciliation in Post-Conflict Colombia: Some
Considerations for Future Canadian Engagement 1, 7 (Focal, Policy Paper No. FPP-04-3
(2004), available at http://www.focal.ca/pdf/colombia04.pdf.
26. See Cahn, supra note 21, at 247-49.
27. For example, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights “recognize[s] the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living . . .
including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of
living conditions.” International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights,
G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), ¶ 11(1), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Jan. 3, 1976).
28. The war in the DRC is immensely complex and has been called Africa’s First




29. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 40/155 (Dec. 16, 1985); G.A. Res. 39/160(Dec. 17, 1984); G.A.
Res. 38/71 (Dec. 15, 1983); BETHÉLEMY JEAN-CLAUDE, ET AL., OECD DEV. CTR., THE
DISARMAMENT DIVIDEND: CHALLENGES F DEVELOPMENT POLICY (2004), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/23/29/1918844.pdf; David A. Koplow & Philip G. Schrag,
Carrying a Big Carrot: Linking Multilateral Disarmament and Development Assistance,
91 COLUM. L. REV. 993 (1991); Herbert Wulf, Disarmament as a Chance for Human
Development — Is There a Peace Dividend? (UNDP, Occasional Paper No. 5, 1992),
available at http://hdr.undp.org/docs/publications/ocational_papers/oc5.htm.
In addition to criminal and civil accountability (rights-based
justice), perhaps the most significant form of justice for women is
assistance traditionally associated with development, as it provides
critical social services and facilitates all aspects of post conflict
reconstruction.26 This article seeks to expand conceptions of
international justice in the post conflict setting to include social,
economic, and development-based rights.27 It does not cover all
aspects of social services justice in post conflict countries. Rather,
it examines two aspects of gender that are integral to post conflict
reconstruction and involve women’s differing roles during conflict:
the significance of integrating gender into the process of DDR and
the necessity of domestic responses to the crimes of sexual violence.
Although this article uses the war in the Democratic Republic of
Congo (DRC) as the primary paradigm for examining these aspects,
the lessons are applicable to many other post conflict countries.28
At the most basic level, DDR must be integrated with democ-
racy promotion, gender equality, and economic and social develop-
ment. Indeed, a linkage between disarmament and development
has long been acknowledged.29 This recognition must inform
ongoing DDR efforts. By focusing on violence against women, the
article demonstrates how domestic reforms in the post conflict
context can have a triple impact of ensuring justice for past crimes,
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30. See, e.g., Christine Chinkin, Gender, Human Rights, and Peace Agreements, 18
OHIO  ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 867, 867 (2003). (“The notion of a peace agreement or
settlement as a pivotal moment for determining the future constitutional and legal
framework of a post-conflict zone has become dominant.”).
31. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SEEKING JUSTICE: THE PROSECUTION OF SEXUAL
VIOLENCE IN THE CONGO WAR 9-20 (2005), available at http://hrw.org/reports/2005/
drc0305 (documenting sexual violence following the establishment of a transitional
government intended to unify the formerly warring factions pursuant to a peace
agreement) [hereinafter SEEKING JUSTICE].
32. Over two million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the Darfur region of
Sudan “continue to live in a climate of fear, intimidation and violence, restricted to
displaced persons camps because of continuing attacks and intimidation, unable to
return to their homes.” See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SUBMISSION TO THE 38TH ORDINARY
SESSION OF THE AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS (2005), available
at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/11/19/africa12060.htm#Democratic%20Republic%
20of%20the%20Congo.
33. JUDITH G. GA RD A M & MICHELLE J. JARVIS, WOMEN , ARMED CONFLICT AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW  252 (2001) (arguing that even when IHL does apply, “it is the
‘male’ civilian that is taken as the norm and its provisions are construed around their
needs”).
34. See, e.g., RUTI TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (2000); Miriam J. Aukerman,
Extraordinary Evil, Ordinary Crime: A Framework for Understanding Transitional
Justice, 15 HARV. HUM . RTS. J. 39 (2002).
35. See, e.g., JACKSON NYAMUYA MAOGOTO, WAR CRIMES AND REAL POL ITIK  8 (2004)
(“International tribunals . . . have become the international community’s primary
response to humanitarian crises. . . .”); MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND
FORGIVENESS  25 (1998) (“To respond to mass atrocities with legal prosecutions is to
providing penalties for future crimes, and promoting gender
equality.
I. OVERVIEW OF POST CONFLICT TRANSITION
The official end of many contemporary conflicts is marked by
a peace agreement which creates the context for establishing the
legal structure of the post conflict society.30 Nonetheless, violence
may continue long after the peace accords have been signed.31 Parts
of the population may still be in refugee camps or otherwise
displaced from their communities.32 Foreign armies often remain in
the country, armed groups may still have weapons, and there may
be a transitional government in place with little control. Moreover,
international humanitarian law (IHL), traditionally has not
extended to the post conflict context.33 International law scholars
and activists have developed various theories on how to construct
the post conflict context, developing different models of transitional
justice.34 These models grapple with the difficult theoretical issues
of balancing reconciliation and punishment. Most scholars believe
that criminal trials serve as the best method for administering
justice and developing the rule of law in the post conflict context.35
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embrace the rule of law.”). See also Aukerman, supra note 34, at 40 (“While participants
in this debate disagree as to when trials are possible in practice, they generally share
a basic assumption: Prosecuting perpetrators of injustice is the optimal method for
dealing with past atrocities.”); Mary Margaret Penrose, Lest We Fail: The Importance
of Enforcement in International Criminal Law, 15 AM . U. INT ’L L. REV. 321, 393 (2000)
(“Law must come first and enforcement of law is a prerequisite to respect for the law.”).
36. Some countries emerging from conflict have attempted to institute cost-effective
alternatives to criminal tribunals. In Rwanda, for example, gacaca, a traditional African
conflict resolution system is being used to heal the wounds of the 1994 genocide. Library
of Congress, Examples of Reconciliation, http://www.loc.gov/loc/lcib/0504/africa.html
(last visited Jan. 16, 2006). Gacaca “works on the principle of reconciling the parties and
promoting principle of reconciling the parties and promoting social harmony rather than
penalizing the guilty party.” Id. While innovative, gacaca presents its own challenges.
As Amnesty International notes:
Amnesty International is principally concerned with the extrajudicial
nature of the gacaca tribunals. The gacaca legislation does not incorporate
international standards of fair trial. Defendants appearing before the
tribunals are not afforded applicable judicial guarantees so as to ensure
that the proceedings are fair, even though some could face maximum
sentences of life imprisonment.
Implementing gacaca also entails huge logistical problems. Tens of
thousands of detainees will have to be transferred from central prisons to
their home communities for the gacaca hearings. The Rwand[an]
government has not clarified how and in what conditions the detainees will
be transported, accommodated, fed and treated at the local level. The
government’s failure to address these issues could deepen the cruel and
inhumane conditions faced by Rwanda’s prison population.
Press Release, Amnesty International, Rwanda: Gacaca — Gambling with Justice (June
19, 2002), available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engAFR470032002?Open.
37. See, e.g., AMNESTY INT ’L, THE TROUBLED COURSE OF JUSTICE (2000), available at
http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAFR470102000?open&of=ENG-RWA
(“However, the [Rwandan] government has still not fulfilled its pledges to release all
those against whom there is no evidence, the very young, the old and the sick. Instead,
it has repeatedly extended the period of pre-trial detention in clear breach of
international law.”).
38. Mark A. Drumbl, Collective Violence and Individual Punishment: the Criminality
of Mass Atrocity, 99 NW . U. L. REV. 539, 545 (2005) (“In the end, the architecture of the
special field of mass violence is little more than an expropriation of domestic
methodologies . . . already assailed for their suitability to ordinary individual crime and
all the more ill-fitting for cases of extraordinary international crime.”).
Practically, however, prosecutions are very expensive and countries
may have inadequate resources for trial costs.36 In Rwanda, for
example, only a fraction of perpetrators have been prosecuted,
many of the trials have lacked various procedural protections, and
thousands of people remain in detention with no evidence against
them.37
Moreover, a further critique suggests that the norms and
justifications for international criminal law are drawn from
domestic criminal law, which may not provide an appropriate
analogy or basis for prosecuting crimes of mass atrocity.38 For
example, Miriam Aukerman advances several arguments as to why
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39. Aukerman, supra note 34, at 51-52, 57-58, 60.
40. Id. at 66-67.
41. The term lustration derives from the Latin and means “purification.” MERRIAM
WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 695 (10th ed. 1993). Lustration laws had their
heyday in Central and Eastern Europe following the 1989 democratic revolutions. As
Roman David explains, “[l]ustration law is a special public employment law that
regulates the process of examining whether a person holding certain higher public
positions worked or collaborated with the repressive apparatus of the communist
regime.” Roman David, Lustration Laws in Action: The Motives and Evaluation of
Lustration Policy in the Czech Republic and Poland (1989-2001), 28 LA W  & SOC. INQUIRY
387, 388 (2003).
42. MINOW, supra note 35, at 117 (“Reparations, restitution, and apologies present
distinct promises and problems as response to mass atrocity . . . Yet nothing in this
discussion should imply that money payments, returned property, restored religious
sites, or apologies seal the wounds, make victims whole, or clean the slate.”).
43. An example is the Lomé Accord, signed July 7, 1999, ending the Civil War
between the government of Sierra Leone and the RUF/SL. See Peace Agreement
Between the Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United
Front of Sierra Leone, Sierra Leone-R.U.F./S.L., July 7, 1999, available at
http://www.sierra-leone.org/lomeaccord.html [hereinafter Lomé Accord]. Among its
provisions, the Lomé Accord provides for cessation of hostilities (Part One); provides for
the establishment of a transitional government (Part Two); provides for the
establishment of a peacekeeping operation (Part Four); and makes provisions for human
rights and humanitarian relief (Part Five). Id.
prosecution is not the appropriate method to achieve retribution (on
a theoretical level).39 Similarly, she suggests that when it comes to
deterrence, which is often cited as an important justification to
prosecution, it is impossible to determine whether prosecution will
prevent future mass violence or genocide.40 The focus on criminal
trials, truth commissions, lustrations,41 or reparations should
therefore vary, depending on the country’s potential for implement-
ing these mechanisms, as well as the desired outcome. Nonetheless,
focusing on these methods of accountability still centers on perpetra-
tor’s guilt rather than victim’s needs.42 What is needed in the post
conflict context is a more general response to the totality of victim’s
needs, including both accountability and development.
A. Problems in Establishing the Post Conflict Framework
Following the cessation of hostilities, peace agreements set the
basis for transitioning a country from war to peace. Contemporary
peace accords take a holistic approach to post conflict reconstruc-
tion and seek to establish procedures for DDR, security, justice, and
transitional government.43 International organizations and scholars
of international law have emphasized the need to include a
meaningful gender perspective in negotiating and implementing
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44. See, e.g. Chinkin, supra note 30, at 873. Professor Chinkin argues:
An effective peace process should be built on the widest base of
experience and therefore must take account of local women’s lived
experiences during the conflict and their enormous responsibilities post-
conflict. Gender balance does not mean the insertion of a few highly placed
international women into the process but rather listening and responding
to the diverse experiences of women who have lived through the conflict.
Id. at 873.
45. See, e.g., Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, G.A. Res. 34/180, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 193, U.N. Doc. A/34/46,
entered into force Sept. 3, 1981.
46. Chinkin, supra note 30, at 873.
47. Id. at 872-73.
48. See Julie Mertus, Improving the Status of Women in the Wake of War:
Overcoming Structural Obstacles, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT ’L L. 541, 546 (2003) (“On a
pragmatic level, the rights-based approach does not work unless the state has the
capacity to recognize and respond appropriately to the rights claim.”).
49. See generally  THE WORLD BANK, GROWING ON THE ASHES OF CONFLICT (2005).
50. See Mertus, supra note 48, at 546. Professor Chinkin recounts a conversation
with an American serving as a local prosecutor in Kosovo:
Michael Hartmann . . . confirms that despite all of the law reform efforts
in Kosovo, local police still do not have the ability to fairly and effectively
investigate a domestic violence dispute. ‘It’s not necessarily about not
respecting women’s rights,’ Hartmann says, ‘They just don’t know how to
do it. I’m talking the basics, how to get a fresh complaint, how to preserve
evidence.’
Id. at 546.
peace agreements.44 There are three primary reasons to include
women in a peace process. First, human rights norms demand
women’s equal participation in public life;45 second, women at the
peace table can help emphasize the potentially different experiences
of women during conflict;46 and third, if women are involved in
negotiating peace, they become active agents in rebuilding, rather
than passive victims of conflict.47
The general structure for rebuilding a country focuses on
guaranteeing rights. Yet, a rights-based approach presents various
problems for women based upon the ability of the government to
provide for the rights and the ability of women to exercise them.
Establishing rights in a country which has no legal structure for
enforcing those rights is admirable rhetoric, but does not provide
concrete benefits to those unable to exercise those rights.48 Many
countries emerging from conflict have traditions of highly corrupt
governments, low participatory rights in government, and little to
no experience with a vigorous civil society.49 Even those post conflict
nations which have been the benefactors of a great deal of interna-
tional support (such as Kosovo) continue to lack basic institutions
necessary to establish the prerequisites for fundamental human
rights.50 These nations lack a reliable legal system, governmental
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51. Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong
Securities Markets , 48 UCLA L. REV. 781, 849 (2001) (noting that “[t]hese countries
need honest judges and regulators, good disclosure rules, and the beginnings of a
culture of honesty before it makes sense to worry” about other corporate governance
issues, such as the number of independent directors).
52. See, e.g., Stuart Cohn, Teaching in a Developing Country: Mistakes Made and
Lessons Learned in Uganda, 48 J. LEG. EDUC. 101, 104 (1998). In preparing to teach a
course on securities markets in Uganda, Professor Cohn discovered that “[n]othing
existed except the laws, a Capital Markets Authority that had no capital markets to
regulate, and a stock exchange devoid of stock. . . . I had assumed that the statutes,
regulations, and organizational structure reflected market realities and developments
— an assumption based on U.S. experience. . . .” Id. at 104. His advice to other teachers
developing similar courses is not to assume that their students know the law. In
Ugandan law schools, for example, copies of relevant statutes and cases were
unavailable in the numbers necessary for teaching in the classroom and “even when .
. . provided with the materials . . . [students’] lack of training and experience led to
many elementary discussions on meanings and interpretations.” Id. at 108.
53. Mertus, supra note 48, at 546 (“Much to their dismay, human rights education
specialists have found that even the women who are well-educated in their rights may
be prevented by social and cultural forces from asserting them.”).
54. Id.
55. See GA RD A M & JARV IS, supra note 33, at 229.
56. In 2003 the female adult illiteracy rate (over age fifteen) in the Congo was 44.9%.
GLOBAL HEALTH ATLAS, CONGO, DRC: ADULT ILLITERACY, FEMALES , http://atlas.global
health.org/indicator_detail.cfm?IndicatorID=126&Country=CD (last visited Jan. 16,
2006).
transparency, and a legislature capable of enacting legal guaran-
tees.51 In many of these countries as well, the written law and the
law as enforced may differ dramatically.52
Even if a post conflict government has the ability to provide for
rights, women are often unable to exercise those rights because they
lack legal literacy or cannot access them because of longstanding
cultural barriers that reinforce women’s subordinate status.53
Consequently, guaranteeing legal rights does not address the
underlying structural barriers to women’s participation as
citizens.54
Finally, the nature of legal rights does not respond to many of
women’s needs in a post conflict society. Women have economic
needs, and a guaranteed income generally is not a legal right,55 nor
is the right to a market for selling products one grows, nor is the
right to a road for getting to the market. In many post conflict
nations, the conflict disrupted women’s formal education, and it is
not abnormal for half of the female population to be unable to read
and write as a result.56
B. Problems with Post Conflict Donor Aid and Special Needs of
Women
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57. See Maija Halonen-Akatwijuka, Coordination Failure in Foreign Aid 2 (The
World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 3223, 2004), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=531082 (follow “Social Science
Research Network” hyperlink; then select “Open”) (“Donors allocate their funds between
regions, sectors and activities in a recipient country. When there is incomplete
information about the other donors’ aid, coordination failure can occur.”).
58. Id. at 3 (“There are often genuine differences between the donors and the
recipients about how to allocate public funds in the recipient developing country. This
leads to the well-known aid fungibility problem.”).
59. Id. at 2 (“Donors tend to favor social sectors (health and education) over other
public expenditure programs (e.g., transportation).”).
60. See, e.g., Lomé Accord, supra note 43, at art. VI(2)(vi).
61. See, e.g., Statement by the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc
S/PRST/2000/10 (Mar. 23, 2000) (“The Security Council recognizes that the mandates
of peacekeeping missions increasingly include oversight of disarmament, demobilization
and reintegration as one of their functions.”).
Another major problem in post conflict reconstruction is donor
coordination, both with respect to shared priorities and lack of
information.57 Given the paucity of civil society actors in many post
conflict countries, donors are often forced to make their own
determinations as to what aid a country needs. This often results
in the over-funding of certain sectors and the under-funding of
others.58 Alongside such information problems and conflicting needs
determinations, there is an almost inherent conflict between
providing for humanitarian needs and long-term development
projects in post conflict societies.59
II. DDR PROGRAMS
Peace accords generally provide for DDR programs to former
warring factions.60 In the post Cold War world, DDR has become a
staple of most contemporary peace operations.61 DDR is one of the
first steps a society must take in the difficult transition from war
to peace. Each phase is interconnected to the other and success of
one depends upon the success of the other two. The United Nations
offers the following definitions for each component:
Disarmament is the collection of small arms and light and
heavy weapons within a conflict zone. It frequently entails the
assembly and cantonment of combatants; it should also comprise
the development of arms management programmes, including
their safe storage and their final disposition, which m ay entail
their destruction. Dem ining may also be part of this process.
Demobilization refers to the process by which parties to a
conflict begin to disband their military structures and com bat-
ants begin the transformation into civilian life. It generally
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62. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General, The Role of United
Nations Peacekeeping in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, ¶ 6, U.N.
Doc. S/2002/101 (Feb. 11, 2000).
63. See, e.g., United Nations, Peace and Security Through Disarmament,
http://disarmament.un.org/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2006).
64. Women and girls, both ex-combatants and civilians, have specific needs that the
DDR process fails to adequately address. UN DEP ’T FOR DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS (DDA),
GENDER PERSPECTIVES ON DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION (DDR)
1 (2001) [hereinafter GENDER PERSPECTIVES ON DDR].
65. Id. Even if females have played a direct combatant role, there is no assurance
that they will be targeted in a DDR program. See, e.g., id. (quoting SALLY BADEN, INT ’L
LABOUR ORG., POST-CONFLICT MOZAMBIQUE: WOMEN ’S SPECIAL SITUATION: POPULATION
ISSUES AND GENDER PERSPECTIVES TO BE INTEGRATED INTO SKILLS TRAINING AND
EMPLOYMENT (1997).
66. See HOBSON, supra note 9, at 19-20.
entails registration of former combatants; some kind of assis-
tance to enable them to meet their immediate basic needs;
discharge, and transportation to their home communities. It
may be followed by recruitment into a new, unified military
force.
Reintegration refers to the process which allows ex-
combatants and their families to adapt, economically and
socially, to productive civilian life. It generally entails the
provision of a package of cash or in-kind compensation, training,
and job- and income-generating projects. These measures
frequently depend for their effectiveness upon other, broader
undertakings, such as assistance to returning refugees and
internally displaced persons; economic development at the
community and national level; infrastructure rehabilitation;
truth and reconciliation efforts; and institutional reform.
Enhancement of local capacity is often crucial for the long-term
success of reintegration.62
These programs are typically administered by a multilateral
organization or the United Nations.63 This section discusses
problems with how DDR programs have been implemented in the
past and their limitations with respect to gender issues.64
A. Deconstructing DDR Programs
On the most basic level, DDR programs are flawed with respect
to the groups targeted for services. DDR programs are typically
evaluated based upon the numbers of combatants demilitarized or
the number of weapons collected.65 As a result, female soldiers, who
generally play a combat support role and have no weapon to turn in,
are often overlooked and unable to benefit from resettlement
allowances or training programs.66 Many DDR plans implement
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Even when child soldiers are specifically targeted, boy child soldiers receive far
greater attention in the DDR process than girl child soldiers. For example,
demobilization camps usually lack sanitary supplies, bathing facilities, reproductive
health care, child care, psychological support centers, and proper security to protect
women from sexual violence. See generally  DYAN MAZURANA & SUSAN MCKAY, CANADIAN
INT ’L DEV. AGENCY, WHERE ARE THE GIRLS?: GIRLS IN FIGHTING FORCES IN NORTHERN
UGANDA, SIERRA LEONE AND MOZAMBIQUE: THEIR LIVES DURING AND AFTER WAR (2004).
67. In such programs, participants receive some form of personal benefit for turning
over weapons. For example, “In El Salvador, successful personal incentives included in-
kind vouchers for consumer goods, while in Mozambique farm implements or other tools
to assist with productive opportunities worked well.” FORUM ON THE POLICIES AND
PRACTICES OF SMAL L ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS DISARMAMENT IN POST-CONFLICT
TRANSITIONS, SWORDS FOR PLOUGHSHA RES MICRODISARMAMENT IN TRANSITIONS FROM
CONFLICT 16 (2000), available at http://www.fafo.no/pub/rapp/332/332.pdf.
In many DDR programs, ex-combatants receive significant amounts of cash,
particularly when one considers the per capita income of the targeted nation. In Sierra
Leone, for example, where the per capita annual income is less than $200, ex-
combatants were paid $300. See Jeffrey Isima, Cash Payments in Disarmament,
Demobilization and Rehabilitation Programmes in Africa, 2 J. SEC. SECTOR MG M T. 3
(2000), available at http://www.jofssm.org/issues/jofssm_0203_isima.pdf. See also U.S.
DEP ’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFA IRS, BACKGROUND NOTE: SIERRA LEONE, a
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5475.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2006). In Sierra Leone’s
southern neighbor, Liberia, the price for surrendering a weapon is $300. Id. In the DRC,
the total amount of the Transitional Subsistence Allowance, given in three slices, is
approximately $350. THE WORLD BANK, TECHNICAL ANNEX FOR A PROPOSED GRANT OF
SDR 68.1 MILLION (US$100 MILLION EQUIVALENT) TO THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF
CONGO FOR AN EMERGENCY DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION PROJECT 16 (2004)
[hereinafter WORLD BANK TECHNICAL ANNEX]. The first disbursement of $30-$50 would
be received after ex-combatants are released from orientation centers and would also
include a basic household items kit, see infra note 86; the second disbursement of $150
would be paid when the ex-combatant registers in his chosen area of reintegration; and,
several months later, if the ex-combatant is still participating in the DDR process, he
will receive an additional $150. Id. at 15-16. In January 2006, the State Department
reported that the per capita income in the DRC was less than $100. See also U.S. DEP ’T
OF STATE, BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, BACKGROUND NOTE: DEMOCRATIC REPU BLIC  OF
CONGO, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2823.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2006)
[hereinafter BACKGROUND NOTE: DRC].
68. WORLD BANK TECHNICAL ANNEX, supra note 67, at 2. The other three
requirements included: “(I) Congolese nationality; . . . (iii) Proof of membership in a
recognized armed group; (iv) Proof of having taken part in conflict in DRC between
October, 1996 and May, 2003.” Id.
The number of DDR participants is illuminating. As the World Bank’s Multi-Country
Demobilization and Reintegration Project (MDRP) notes, “[a]s of the end of September
[2005], 17,549 men and 331 women were demobilized.” In Sierra Leone, women
accounted for 7.4% (or 4,876) of the 72,490 combatants demobilized. THE WORLD BANK,
THE MULTI-COUNTRY DEM OBIL IZATION AND REINTEGRATION PR O GR AM  (MDRP), DRC,
available at http://www.mdrp.org/drc.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2006) [hereinafter
WORLD BANK MDRP]. See also WOMEN ’S CO M M ’N FOR REFUGEE WOMEN & CHILDREN,
PRECIOUS RESOURCES: PARTICIPATORY RESEARCH STUDY WITH ADOLESCENTS AND YOUTH
“cash for weapons” programs that specifically exclude certain
groups from the demobilization process.67 In the Congo, for example,
one of the four criteria for DDR eligibility includes “possession of a
weapon.”68
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IN SIERRA LEONE APRIL -JULY 2002 7 (2002), available at http://www.womenscommission.
org/reports/sl/13.shtml [hereinafter PRECIOUS RESOURCES].
69. GENDER PERSPECTIVES ON DDR, supra note 64, at 2. The report notes:
[E]x-combatants and their families may also require other types of support,
including psychological trauma counselling, to rebuild their lives. For ex-
combatants the transition to peacetime can be stressful and difficult. There
is a need to look at the psychological transition as well as the
socioeconomic. This is important from a gender equality perspective, as





72. S.C. Res. 1325, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1325 (Oct. 31, 2000).
73. Id. at ¶ 13.
74. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. See also AGNÈS MARCAILLOU, UNITED
NATIONS DEP ’T FOR DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS, GENDER PERSPECTIVES ON D, D AND R 2
(2004), available at http://www.womenwarpeace.org/issues/ddr/CSWgenderDDR.pdf.
75. NOELEEN HEYZER, UNITED NATIONS DEV. FUND FOR WOMEN (UNIFEM), GENDER,
PEACE AND DISARMAMENT 7 (2003). Heyzer notes that “[t]he ultimate goal of
mainstreaming is to achieve gender equality.” Id.
By concentrating on combatants as the primary recipient of
DDR services, rather than combatants in the context of their
families69 and communities, or on victims of combatants, or on
individuals playing a combat support role, DDR programs’ focus is
flawed. A second programmatic weakness is the tendency of DDR
programs to emphasize economic reintegration, rather than
psychological and social rehabilitation in its final stage.70 DDR
programs tend to focus on providing food, allowances, and skills
training, thereby overlooking the need for assistance with post-
traumatic stress, domestic violence, and other psychological
ailments that arise as a result of war.71
B. Reconstructing DDR Programs
In 2000, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1325.72
UNSCOR 1325 emphasizes the importance of women and girls to
peace and security issues and specifically “[e]ncourages all those
involved in the planning for disarmament, demobilization and
reintegration to consider the different needs of female and male ex-
combatants and to take into account the needs of their
dependants.”73 The U.N. is currently addressing this issue through
“gender mainstreaming,”74 which involves “assessing the implica-
tions for women and men of any planned action, including legisla-
tion, policies, or programmes.”75 In its strategic plan on gender
mainstreaming, the U.N.’s Department for Disarmament Affairs
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76. DEP ’T FOR DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS, GENDER MAINSTREAMING ACTION PLAN, PUB.
VERSION 2 (2003), available at http://www.disarmament2.un.org/gender/gmap.pdf
[hereinafter DDA GENDER MAINSTREAMING].
77. See, e.g., GA RD A M & JARV IS, supra note 33, at 256 (proposing the use of legal
instruments to create a convention focusing on the protection of women in times of
armed conflict).
78. Id.
79. A recent example of multilateral organizations recognizing the centrality of
gender to successful post conflict reconstruction is the 2001 Bonn Agreement, recreating
the state of Afghanistan. As the Initiative for Inclusive Security explains, “[t]he Bonn
Agreement (2001) paved the way for the establishment of a Ministry of Women’s Affairs
as part of the new Afghanistan administration.” INITIATIVE FOR INCLUSIVE SEC., GENDER
AND POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION: LESSONS LE AR N ED  FR O M AFGHANISTAN (2003),
available at http://www.womenwagingpeace.net/content/articles/0245a.html.
80. See, e.g. PRECIOUS RESOURCES, supra note 68, at 12-13. Although the
recommendations are tailored to Sierra Leone, they provide useful insights for other
DDR programs.
81. Id.
sets out an action plan which can be adapted in developing DDR
programs and ensures “incorporation of gender perspectives.”76
As the Security Council has already adopted Resolution 1325,
one possible step could be a convention-type instrument explicitly
addressing the importance of gender in a broader post conflict
context.77 Two scholars suggest that such an instrument could be
added to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women as a protocol and thereby open for
ratification by all states, thus ensuring broad adherence to the
principles.78 Nonetheless, as this article argues, legal instruments
are not panaceas. As discussed earlier, rights-based documents
provide aspirations, but until those aspirations are implemented,
they provide insufficient help on the ground.
Whether accomplished through a combination of gender
mainstreaming, women-focused activities, or the promotion of
gender equality, post conflict reconstruction must make gender
central. Until a gender-centered perspective is implemented, post
conflict reconstruction will remain ineffective.79
1. Redesigning DDR Programs with Gender Centrality
Various reforms can be implemented throughout the DDR
process to improve responsiveness to gender.80 Basic recommenda-
tions include independent assessments of the DDR process with a
mandated gender analysis; increased collaboration with youth
groups and networks in order to facilitate community acceptance of
stigmatized victims; and sensitivity training for deployed peace-
keepers.81
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In the most notorious instance of abuse perpetrated by peacekeepers, U.N.
peacekeepers in the Congo (primarily, though not exclusively, from Nigeria) were
alleged to have committed sexual abuse and rape of Congolese women, some as young
as thirteen. Peacekeepers in Congo Abused Girls, MSNBC.COM , Jan. 7, 2005,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6800560/from/RL.2/#storyContinued. A total of seventy-
two allegations, resulting in twenty cases, were made against U.N. personnel. Id. In
2005, Jane Holl Lute, U.N. Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations,
condemned the incidents and shamefully noted, “[t]he blue (U.N.) helmet has become
black and blue, through self-inflicted wounds of some of our number. And we will not
sit still until the luster of that blue helmet is restored.” United Nations Organization
Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo: A Case for Peacekeeping Reform: Briefing
and Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Africa, Global Human Rights, and Int’l
Operations of the Comm. on Int’l Relations, 109th Cong. 22 (2005) (statement of Jane
Holl Lute, United Nations Assistant Secretary-General for Mission Support in the
Department of Peacekeeping Operations).
82. See, e.g., Chinkin, supra note 30, at 877.
83. FARR, supra note 9, at 41-47. Farr has developed an extensive checklist of issues
which seeks “to draw attention to the particular challenges that face women
combatants, the wives of male soldiers and war widows during the demobilization phase
and the process of reintegration. . . .” Id. at 40.
84. According to its website:
MDRP is a multi-agency effort that supports the demobilization and
reintegration of ex-combatants in the greater Great Lakes region of Central
Africa. The largest program of its kind in the wold, MDRP currently targets
an estimated 450,000 ex-combatants in seven countries: Angola, Burundi,
the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the
Republic of Congo, Rwanda and Uganda.
WORLD BANK MDRP, supra note 68.
85. Id.
In their implementation, DDR programs should include
increased cooperation among governments, NGOs, and civil society
institutions. Indeed, increased coordination and support of local
women’s organizations that focus on disarmament and peace could
effectively address gender issues that might otherwise be
neglected.82 DDR programs can also be designed with gender
centrality by preventing the use of gender stereotyping in skill and
job trainings, ensuring adequate health and child care facilities
(including separate bathrooms and maternity clinics) for female
participants, and, if money is distributed, determining whether
women have access to banks to deposit funds.83
The rhetoric of DDR programs concerning gender has certainly
improved, however, problems with applying gender equality in
programming remain. For example, although the Multi-Country
Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP)84 for the Great
Lakes Region requires, among other gender-specific requirements,
that benefits for male and female combatants at demobilization
centers be equal,85 a strict adherence to the rhetoric could be
counter-productive. For example, with respect to special reintegra-
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86. As Emily Schroeder notes:
“Immediate Assistance kits” in the DRC include a clothing kit (bag,
blankets, shoes, trousers, t-shirts and underwear); domestic kit (soap,
glasses, plates, pots, jerrycan); food kit (corn flour, vegetables, vegetable oil
and iodized salt); and sanitary kits (condoms and brochure on sexual
health). The reintegration kits for women also include female condoms,
while pregnant women receive soap, plastic sheeting, razor blades, cord,
brochure on healthy birthing, bag and cotton cloth.
Emily Schroeder, A Window of Opportunity in the Democratic Republic of Congo:
Incorporating a Gender Perspective on the Disarmament, Demobilization and
Reintegration Process, 5 PEACE, CONFLICT & DEV. 1, 24 (2003), http://www.peacestudies
journal.org.uk/docs/AWindowofOpportunity.PDF (internal citations omitted).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See generally DUTH IE, supra note 20 (arguing that the integration of transitional
justice measures to the process of reintegration of ex-combatants is critical to post
conflict reconstruction).
90. See INT ’L PEACE ACAD., A FRAMEWORK FOR LASTING DISARMAMENT,
DEMOBILIZATION, AND REINTEGRATION OF FORMER COMBATANTS IN CRISIS SITUATIONS
6 (2002), available at http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/hal07/hal07.pdf [hereinafter IPA
FRAMEWORK ] (“DDR programs must be part of an integrated national recovery strategy.
This strategy should encompass . . . justice and reconciliation initiatives. . . .”).
91. Id. at 4 (“In cases such as Sierra Leone where ex-combatants have committed
atrocities against the civilian population, there is resentment over what is often seen
as their ‘special treatment’”.).
tion kits,86 the MDRP policy in practice might mean that where men
receive condoms, women would receive female condoms.87 Such a
focus on providing “equal benefits,” however, may overlook women’s
additional need for sanitary supplies.88 Equality, therefore,
necessitates accounting for the different needs that men and women
face, rather than merely requiring equal provisions.
2. Reconceptualizing DDR
If DDR programs are to contribute to long-term peace and
stability, they must take a holistic approach to post conflict
reconstruction. Critically, DDR programs must integrate a justice
component.89 Without doing so, true national reconciliation will
never occur.90 If for example, individuals who are perceived as
having committed egregious human rights violations or war crimes
are rewarded with money and skills, tensions will naturally develop
between them and noncombatants who do not receive such assis-
tance and who do not see human rights abuses being punished.91
This section considers four methods of reconceptualizing DDR. Not
surprisingly, each method has positives and negatives.
The first method favors equality over stability. The Interna-
tional Peace Academy (IPA) suggests, for example, “[o]ffering
reintegration benefits directly to the communities in which ex-
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92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See also DUTH IE, supra note 20, at 22 (“One way of linking DDR programs to
transitional justice is to completely deny these benefits to anyone who is guilty of
committing human rights violations during the conflict.”).
95. DUTH IE, supra note 20, at 18.
96. See, e.g., SEEKING JUSTICE, supra note 31, at 8 (suggesting that the U.N., and
other multilateral donors “[e]nsure that a vetting process is implemented in all military
integration programs”).
97. Kess Kingma argues for such a middle-of-the-road approach. See Kess Kingma,
The Role of Demobilisation in the Peace and Development Process in Sub-Saharan
Africa: Conditions for Success, 5 AFRICAN SEC. REV. 1 (1996), available at
http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/ASR/5No6/Kingma.html (“[I]t would strengthen people’s
confidence in the future if past human rights violations of members of the armed forces
are dealt with. However, this might create a dilemma. These people should be
appropriately punished, but heavy punishment might actually increase tensions
between the military and the rest of society.”).
Some DDR programs have attempted to implement this approach, with varying
degrees of success. In Colombia, for example, the government must check whether those
combatants (as well as other displaced populations) are to be
reintegrated” rather than to the ex-combatants themselves.92 On
the positive side, this serves to mitigate tensions which may have
developed between ex-combatants and non-combatants. It also
serves to tie ex-combatants into their community. On the negative
side, as IPA concedes, “since idle ex-combatants pose a serious
threat to peace and security, they must indeed receive special
attention.”93
A second method is a hard and fast rule of denying reintegra-
tion benefits to anyone who has committed human rights violations.
Such a proposal has been under discussion for several years in the
context of the DRC’s DDR program.94 Positively, this serves the
dual purpose of signaling to community members that human
rights violations will not be rewarded as well as increasing funding,
as international donors are more likely to fund projects incorporat-
ing human rights.95 Such an approach does have associated
problems. Foremost, the scale of human rights violations in many
of these conflicts is so widespread that to enforce such a norm
would be unrealistic and counter-productive. Indeed, adherence to
such a norm would mean there would be very few to reintegrate.
A third approach would be to screen all ex-combatants for
human rights abuses yet only deny reintegration benefits to those
responsible for committing truly egregious violations unlikely to be
prosecuted by the International Criminal Court (ICC).96 Positively,
such an approach is a realistic modification of the previous
approach and strikes a balance between community concerns and
disarmament requirements.97 Several negative aspects are associ
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seeking demilitarization are subject to ongoing prosecution. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
COLO MB IA: LETT ING PARAMILITARIES OFF THE HOOK 7 (2005), available at http://hrw.org/
backgrounder/americas/colombia0105/colombia0105.pdf. Nonetheless, Human Rights
Watch has grave reservations with the program’s implementation and offers some
thoughtful recommendations:
Under current procedures, the government conducts only a cursory check
of its records to determine whether the individuals who are demobilizing
are already the subjects of ongoing prosecutions or convictions. If they are
not, they can immediately start receiving benefits. There is no further
effort to carefully investigate each individual to determine whether he
might be linked to crimes against humanity or other abuses. Because most
paramilitary crimes do not yet have a known author, it is very likely that
many individuals who have committed massacres, kidnappings, or other
crimes will be able to avoid detection and prosecution. In effect, historically
endemic failures to properly investigate and prosecute paramilitary abuses
would become guarantees of impunity today.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
Human Rights Watch has also recommended that international donors withhold
support from the DDR process until the Colombian legislature enacts a “comprehensive
demobilization law” that conditions DDR benefits on armed groups’ cooperation with the
justice process by assisting law enforcement authorities in investigations of past crimes.
Id. at 15.
Under the MDRP, the DDR plan in the DRC also provides for the exclusion of
combatants suspected of war crimes. See, e.g., THE WORLD BANK, GREATER GREAT LAKES
REGIO NAL STRATEGY FOR DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION, Report No. 23869-AFR,
(2002), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/
IB/2002/04/19/000094946_0204100401206/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf. The Strategy
explains:
Preliminary figures indicate that potentially 350,000 ex-combatants
could be demobilized and reintegrated under the MDRP. This figure
includes both ex-military and members of irregular forces. The screening
of ex-combatants for war crimes would be an important activity and would
be undertaken by national programs in coordination with relevant national
and international authorities (for example, MONUC, the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda). Ex-combatants who are found to have
committed war crimes would not be eligible for assistance in any national
program or special project.
Id. at 20. To the author’s knowledge, this screening has not been implemented.
98. For example, the thousands of trials that would need to be conducted would
certainly overwhelm the justice system in many post conflict countries.
ated with this method. First, such an approach is difficult to
implement and may be beyond the means of many third world
nations emerging from decades of conflict.98 Problems are also
associated with implementation of the screening process. Chal-
lenges range from ensuring that the vetting is done as neutrally as
possible and in a manner that protects the procedural due process
rights of alleged perpetrators, to protecting the security of groups
that engage in the identification and vetting process, to establishing
standards for who will be screened out of the DDR program.
Although many victims know their perpetrators and may have
identified them to local NGOs or authorities, the need to guard
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99. See Stephanie K. Wood, A Woman Scorned for the “Least Condemned” War
Crime: Precedent and Problems with Prosecuting Rape as a Serious War Crime in the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 13 COLUM. J. GENDER &  L. 274, 319
(2004).
100. Vetting processes, through which individuals suspected of past human rights
abuses are screened from continuation in or commencement of public service jobs, raise
similarly difficult issues, and most programs offer procedural protections to those
screened out. See, e.g., The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General, The
Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post Conflict Societies, U.N. Doc.
S/2004/616 (Aug. 3, 2004).
101. See, e.g., Joel R. Reidenberg, Resolving Conflicting International Data Privacy
Data Rules in Cyberspace, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1326-27 (2000) (identifying ten
principles to which an organization must adhere with respect to personal information).
102. See, e.g., Antonia Sherman, Note, Sympathy for the Devil: Examining a
Defendant’s Right to Confront Before the International Crimes Tribunal, 10 EMORY INT ’L
L. REV. 833 (1996).
103. See generally David, supra note 41; Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule,
Transitional Justice as Ordinary Justice, 117 HARV. L. REV. 761, 805 (2004) (“Privacy
law permits one to conceal those parts of one’s past that are not of great relevance to
the present; lustration law forces one to reveal those parts of one’s past that are of great
relevance to the present.”).
against false allegations remains. A possible solution could entail
using reliable and well-established civil society groups that can
verify the names on their lists, as well as collecting information
from local prosecutors, court systems, and the military justice
system (to the extent that such institutions and records exist)
where victims may have attempted to file complaints. Many NGOs
engage in rigorous data collection and could provide invaluable
assistance for purposes of DDR screening.99
Particularly because ex-combatants will challenge their
identification as perpetrators, not only should the lists be highly
reliable, but human rights norms may require that the ex-combat-
ant receive an opportunity at a later stage to clear his name.100
There are emerging norms in international law with regard to data
collection.101 Moreover, the international war crimes tribunals have
also developed jurisprudence concerning the right to confront
witnesses.102 Finally, lustration laws have also dealt with sensitive
data.103
A second potential criticism is the argument that soldiers will
not participate in a DDR program in which they will be subject to
screening and possible prosecution. Such criticisms are generally
misplaced. DDR offers the lure of money and skills training. Such
incentives will, for most former combatants, be so great that they
would be willing to risk the minute probability that they would be
identified as having perpetrated a war crime. Indeed, given that
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104. AMNESTY INT ’L, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO: MASS RAPE: TIME FOR
REMEDIES 29-30 (2004), available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/AFR620182004
ENGLISH/$File/AFR6201804.pdf [hereinafter MASS RAPE] (noting that “[t]he vast
majority of Congo’s 50 million people live on around 20 US cents per person per day,
and eat less than two thirds of the calories needed to maintain health”).
105. Roger Duthie explains:
Another way of linking transitional justice and DDR programs is to
condition benefits on cooperation with a specific justice effort. In Colombia,
for example, among competing proposals for a legal framework for the
demobilization of paramilitaries, Senator Piedad Cordoba’s would make the
provision of benefits conditional on confession of crimes before a truth
commission.
DUTH IE, supra note 20, at 22.
106. Beth Dougherty, for example, considers a study conducted by a Sierra Leonean
NGO on the views of ex-combatants toward the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation
Commission (SLTRC). The findings are worth quoting at length:
A majority of ex-combatants had heard about the SLTRC, supported it,
and expressed a willingness to testify before it. However, the study did not
determine if in testifying the ex-combatant planned to confess their own
abuses or merely address events they had witnessed; in any case only 15%
of those surveyed believed they had done anything wrong. The study also
revealed that nearly half of the ex-combatants did not feel that they
understood the SLTRC.
Concern about the SCSL [Special Court for Sierra Leone] and fears for
their security (witness protection was rudimentary at best) initially kept
ex-combatant participation low. But as the hearings went on, and the SCSL
did not pursue those who testified, more and more ex-combatants came
forward. Many ex-combatants wanted to return to their communities but
were afraid of their reception; participating in the SLTRC was a means of
easing the path of reintegration. In at least four districts, perpetrators
(mostly RUF) [Revolutionary United Front] came forward and publicly
asked forgiveness. By the end, an unprecedented 13% of individual
statements came from perpetrators, and “approximately a third of those
who appeared in hearings admitted to their own wrongs, often in great
detail.”
Beth K. Dougherty, Searching for Answers: Sierra Leone’s Truth & Reconciliation
Commission, 8 AFR. STUD. Q. 39, 48 (2004).
most Congolese survive on less than $2 per week, a promise of more
than $300 is a significant incentive.104
A final approach would be to condition full participation in
DDR programs on confessions to crimes and then reducing any
subsequent sentencing, or simply requiring the combatant to testify
in front of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission.105 Positively,
there is good reason to believe that ex-combatants would support
the truth-finding process as a requirement to DDR.106 Negatively,
such an approach may not go far enough for many victims, thus
hindering reintegration.
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107. See DUTH IE, supra note 20, at 23.
108. UNITED NATIONS DEV . FUND FOR WOMEN (UNIFEM), ISSUE BRIEF ON
DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION (DDR), http://www.womenwar
peace.org/issues/ddr/ddr_pfv.pdf (last visited Jan. 16, 2006). UNIFEM notes:
In order to ensure the effectiveness of peace support operations, the
principles of gender equality must permeate the entire mission, at all
levels, thus ensuring the participation of women and men as equal partners
and beneficiaries in all aspects of the peace process — from peacekeeping,
reconciliation and peace-building, towards a situation of political stability
in which women and men play an equal part in the political, economic and
social development of their country.
Id. at 5 (quoting the Namibia Platform to Mainstream Gender in Multidimensional
Peace Operations).
109. International humanitarian law (IHL) tends to be more useful because it is
generally more developed than the domestic laws of many nations emerging from
conflict.
110. Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol, Out of the Shadows: Traversing the
Imaginary of Sameness, Difference, and Relationalism — A Human Rights Proposal,
17 WIS. WOMEN ’S L.J. 111, 140-41 (2002) (“[L]ocally and globally women do not enjoy the
universal human rights to which they are legally entitled. . . . [W]omen are a long way
from being full citizens who are universally respected or heard, let alone safe.”).
111. See, e.g., U.N. OFFICE FOR THE COORD. OF HUMAN. AFFS., GENDER-BASED
Whichever of the aforementioned approaches is implemented,
for national healing to take root, DDR programs must incorporate
a justice component.107
III. GENDERED LAWS
Responding to gender issues through DDR is critical in
establishing the context for gender equality.108 In the short term, it
provides an opportunity early in the post conflict process to focus on
equity, to include women in training and community-based
programs, and to screen for human rights abusers. A second
gender-related aspect to post conflict reconstruction involves more
long-term concerns about women’s status under domestic law as
enshrined in both civil and criminal law, and inscribed in cultural
practices. The justice focus in large-scale conflicts and their
aftermath is often on the role of international law.109 This section
argues for a change in focus to domestic issues. Specifically, it calls
for changing the domestic law, culture, and tolerance for rape that
stems from women’s secondary status and archaic laws.110
A. The Scope of the Problem
The scale and scope of sexual violence against women in many
contemporary international and intra-state conflicts are almost
incomprehensible.111
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VIOLENCE: A SILENT, VICIOUS EPIDE MIC , http://www.irinnews.org/webspecials/GBV/ (last
visited Jan. 16, 2006). The report notes:
An estimated half a million women were raped during the 1994 genocide
in Rwanda. A staggering 50% of all women in Sierra Leone were subjected
to sexual violence, including rape, torture and sexual slavery, according to
a 2002 report by Physicians for Human Rights. In Liberia, an estimated 40
percent of all girls and women have fallen victim to abuse. During the war
in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the 1990s, between 20,000 and 50,000 women
were raped.
Id.
With regard to the Congolese War, a spokesperson for the U.N. World Food
Programme observed, “[w]e have never come across as many victims of rape in a conflict
situation” as in the Congo. DRC Vows to Punish Rapists, NE W S24.COM , Jan. 26, 2004,
http://www.news24.com/News24/Africa/News/0,,2-11-1447_1474364,00 html (quoting
Christiane Berthiaume).
A 2002 Human Rights Watch report on sexual violence against the women of Congo
presents a harrowing picture of widespread abuse and unimaginable cruelty:
[T]here were other cases where the rapists inflicted severe injury on their
victims by penetrating their vaginas with sticks or other objects or by
mutilating their sexual organs with such weapons as knives or razor
blades. A gynecologist said that in his many years of work he had never
seen atrocities like those committed against women who had been raped
whom he has treated recently. Among the cases are women whose clitoris
and vagina lips had been cut off with razor blades.
HUMAN  RIGHTS WATCH, THE WAR WITHIN THE WAR: SEXUAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
AND GIRLS IN EASTERN CONGO 54 (2004), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/
2002/drc/Congo0602.pdf [hereinafter WAR WITHIN THE WAR].
The actual number of women subjected to gender-based violence in the Congo is not
known as many attacks often occur in remote areas where it is difficult to contact
victims. See PEACEWOMEN , DRC: FOCUS ON RAMPANT RAPE, DESPITE END OF WAR (2004),
http://www.peacewomen.org/news/DRC/Mar04/rampant.html. Nevertheless, observers
believe that, once it is finally established, the number of women subjected to sexual
violence in the Congo will be much higher than the numbers in either Rwanda or
Bosnia. See id.; see also Edith Lederer, U.N. Report: Women Hard-Hit by Congo War.
ASSOC. PRESS, Oct. 29, 2003, http://www.congokin.com/news/categories/society/archives/
story1724.html.
In the conflict in Sierra Leone, Amnesty International reports that between seventy-
five and ninety percent of all abducted girls and young women were sexually abused
during the conflict. AMNESTY INT ’L, SIERRA LEONE: RAPE AND OTHER FO R MS OF SEXUAL
VIOLENCE AGAINST GIRLS AND WOMEN , http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAFR
510352000?open&of=ENG-SLE (last visited Jan. 16, 2006). Women and girls were
forcefully abducted into combat, enduring repeated rape and forced sexual servitude
(referred to as “AK-47 marriages”). WOMEN ’S CO M M ’N FOR REFUGEE WOMEN AND
CHILDREN, DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION AND GENDER-BASED
VIOLENCE IN SIERRA LEONE 4 (2002) [hereinafter COM M ’N FOR REFUGEE WOMEN ]. Not
only were civilians the victims of gender-based violence, so too were female soldiers,
proving that joining a militia did not provide immunity from sexual violence. AMNESTY
INT ’L, SIERRA LEONE: 1998 A YEAR OF ATROCITIES AGAINST CIVILIANS (1998), available
at http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAFR510221998?open&of=ENG-SLE.
Similarly, in its report on child soldiers in the Congo, Amnesty International found that
virtually all girl soldiers had either been raped or sexually attacked by commanding
officers or others in their units. AMNESTY INT ’L, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO:
CHILDREN AT WAR, para. 2.3 (2003), available at http://www.amnesty.org/library/index/
ENGAFR620342003.
In contemporary conflicts rape has come to be used as a weapon
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112. The armed conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina of 1992-1995 represents an extreme
circumstance. The systematic rape of an estimated 20,000 Muslim women by Serbian
forces was used as a tool of “ethnic cleansing.” See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, RAPE  IN
BOSN IA-HERCEGOVINA, http://www.hrw.org/about/projects/womrep/General-25.htm (last
visited Jan. 16, 2006). Reports indicate that “Muslim women in Bosnia were forcibly
impregnated and held in rape camps until they were too far into their pregnancies to
abort the ‘ethnically-cleansed’ children.” Tara Gingerich & Jennifer Leaning, U.S.
AGENCY FOR INT ’L DEV., THE USE OF RAPE AS A WEAPON OF WAR IN THE CON FLIC T IN
DARFUR, SUDAN 8 (2004), available at http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2004/
hu-sud-31oct.pdf.
113. See MARION PRATT & LEAH WERCHICK, U.S. AGENCY FOR INT ’L DEV., DEV. FUND
FOR WOMEN , SEXUAL TERRORISM : RAPE AS A WEAPON OF WAR IN EASTERN DEM OCR ATIC
REPU BLIC  OF CONGO : AN ASSESSMENT OF PROGRAMMATIC RESPONSES TO SEXUAL
VIOLENCE IN NORTH KIVU, SOUTH KIVU, MA N IE M A, AND ORIENTALE PROVINCES 9 (2004),
available at http://www.peacewomen.org/resources/DRC/USAIDDCHADRC.pdf. See also
Sherrie L. Russell-Brown, The Last Line of Defense: The Doctrine of Command
Responsibility, Gender Crimes in Armed Conflict and the Kahan Report (Sabra &
Shatilla) 9 (2003), available at http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/41/ (“Allowing the
commission of gender crimes could also be viewed as a tactic of war, a way to
demoralize, terrorize, and in the case of Bosnia and Rwanda, a way to destroy one’s
enemy.”).
114. Because abortion is illegal or difficult to obtain in many countries emerging from
conflict, women may try to arrange illegal abortions, often with disastrous
consequences. See Naomi Cahn & Anne T. Goldstein, The Constitution, Reproductive
Rights, and Feminism: Roe and Its Global Impact 6 U. PA. J. CONST . L. 695, 701 (2004).
While practically no maternal deaths are attributed to unsafe abortions in the United
States, unsafe abortions account for thirteen percent of maternal death in the rest of
the world. Id. at 720.
115. See JSI RESEARCH & TRAINING INST., ASSESSMENT OF REPRODUCTIVE HEAL TH IN
THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO 12 (2002), available at http://www.rhrc.org/pdf/
drc_rh.pdf. The report notes:
Gang rapes by military forces, who have been shown to have higher STI
and HIV infection rates than civilian populations, place women at risk for
STIs. The Médecin Chef de Zone at Shabunda general hospital estimated
that 80% of women treated at the hospital had STIs. According to MSF, at
least one of the five women who went to the hospital in Bukavu for
reconstructive surgery following a rape tested positive for HIV and was
therefore refused care.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
of war to terrorize and dehumanize the population.112 Rape is used
to establish the power of soldiers to take what they want, to punish
anyone suspected of sympathizing with another faction, and to
humiliate individuals and communities.113 The sexual violence
against women and girls affects them physically, psychologically,
economically, and socially.
The health impact of gender-based violence, is perhaps, the
easiest to comprehend. Consequences range from unwanted
pregnancies, miscarriages caused by the abuse, illness or death
from illegal abortions,114 and sexually transmitted diseases,
including HIV-AIDS.115
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116. See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS HIGH CO M M ’R FOR REFUGEES, SEXUAL AND GENDER-
BASED VIOLENCE AGAINST REFUGEES, RETURNEES AND INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS
10 (2003), available at http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/protect/opendoc.pdf?tbl=
PROTECTION&id=3f696bcc4.
117. See LASHAWN R. JEFFERSON, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, IN WAR AS IN PEACE,
http://www.hrw.org/wr2k4/15.htm (last visited, Jan. 16, 2006).
118. Id. (“Post-traumatic stress syndrome and other lasting psychological
consequences of assault plague women survivors and can obstruct their full and
productive reintegration into civil society.”).
119. WAR WITHIN THE WAR, supra note 111, at 66.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 65-66.
122. PRATT & WERCHICK, supra note 113, at 12. The authors explain:
[U]p to 5000 children resulting from rape during the genocide in Rwanda
were labeled ‘children of hate’ and ‘unwanted children.’ It is unknown how
many such children there are in eastern Congo. Abortion is illegal in DRC,
and the traditional capacity and willingness of Congolese families to adopt
orphans or unwanted children have been extremely diminished by the
current levels of poverty throughout the country. . . .
Id.
123. Emily Wax, Rwandans Are Struggling to Love Children of Hate, WASH . POST,
Mar. 28, 2004 at A1.
Sexual violence also has profound psychological consequences
on its victims.116 Victims experience insomnia, depression, post-
traumatic stress disorder, and suicidal ideations.117 All of these
symptoms are exacerbated by the unavailability of appropriate
health services and make the reintegration of women into post
conflict society all the more difficult.118 Many of these women are
often frightened to report their rapes, fearing ostracism from their
homes and communities. This fear is not misplaced. As Human
Rights Watch notes, “[u]nmarried women and girls who became
pregnant as a result of rape were far less likely to find husbands in
the future and so risked remaining always on the margins of
society.”119 Indeed, one doctor in the Congo estimated that an
unmarried woman who had conceived a child by rape “would have
only a 20 percent chance of being married in the future.”120 Other
young unmarried women who have conceived a child may be
entirely abandoned by their families leaving them with no economic
support.121 Finally, mothers themselves may reject children
resulting from rape because the children are a visible and constant
reminder of their abuse.122 In Rwanda, raped women sometimes
labeled their children “little killers” while others abandoned their
children or killed them.123
B. International Law and Violence Against Women
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124. The effectiveness of these international tribunals, however, remains
questionable. As Jose Alvarez suggests with respect to international dispute settlement,
this “requires a meaningful, long-term political commitment involving substantial
resources and extensive efforts to provide transparency that, at least with respect to
international tribunals, is not now apparent.” Jose E. Alvarez, The New Dispute
Settlers: (Half) Truths and Consequences, 38 TEX. INT ’L L.J. 405, 412 (2003); Diane
Orentlicher, Judging Global Justice: Assessing the International Criminal Court, 21
WIS. INT ’L L.J. 495, 500-03 (2003) (acknowledging the many challenges and weaknesses
of international tribunals, such as their failure to deter crimes).
125. See, e.g., Kelly D. Askin, Sexual Violence in Decisions and Indictments of the
Yugoslav and Rwandan Tribunals: Current Status, 93 AM  J. INT ’L L. 97, 97 (1999).
126. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S.
90, 37 I.L.M. 1002 (1998), available at www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm
[hereinafter Rome Statute].
127. Id. at art. 43(6) (“This Unit shall provide, in consultation with the Office of the
Prosecutor, protective measures and security arrangements, counselling and other
appropriate assistance for witnesses, victims who appear before the Court, and others
who are at risk on account of testimony given by such witnesses.”).
128. E.g., Barbara Bedont & Katherine Hall Martinez, Ending Impunity for Gender
Crimes Under the International Criminal Court, 6 BROWN J. WORLD AFF . 65, 69-74
(1999) (providing a detailed account of the statute’s provisions on crimes of sexual
violence); Jocelyn Campanaro, Note, Women, War, and International Law: The
Historical Treatment of Gender-Based War Crimes, 89 GEO. L.J. 2557 (2001).
129. See, e.g., Rana Lehr-Lehnardt, Note, One Small Step for Women: Female-
Friendly Provisions in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 16 BYU
J. PUB. L. 317, 345-46 (2002). Lehr-Lehnhardt notes:
Rape still cannot be prosecuted as a crime in and of itself — as rape.
Instead, it must be prosecuted as a subset of a war crime, a crime against
humanity or genocide. Additional reasons why this step forward can
arguably be classified as only a small step are because perpetrators of
violence against women continue to serve relatively short sentences,
because the ICC did not provide for means by which to deter future
aggressors, and because protection for witnesses and victims is not yet
adequate.
130. See, e.g., HUMAN  RIGHTS WATCH, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO:
CONFRONTING IMPUNITY 2 (2004), available at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/02/02/
congo7230_txt.pdf [hereinafter CONFRONTING IMPUNITY] (calling for “the creation and
financial support of measures to enable adequate investigation and prosecution of a
large number of these crimes”). The NGO has also recommended the development of a
The availability of international tribunals to impose criminal
liability for violence against women symbolically shows the
horrendous nature of these crimes.124 Nonetheless, the recognition
of gender-based violence by international tribunals is recent.125 The
new ICC statute,126 which has specific provisions dealing with
gender-based violence including the creation of a victim-witness
unit,127 is an example of the development of a new approach to
sexual violence.128 There are, however, limitations to this
approach.129
Recommendations have been made to more efficiently employ
both the domestic and international justice systems to end the
impunity that has protected rapists in the Congo.130 Overall, these
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fair and transparent Truth and Reconciliation Commission to handle some of the crimes
committed during the war. Id.
131. See generally id.
132. See William Burke-White, Regionalization of International Criminal Law
Enforcement: A Preliminary Exploration, 38 TEX. INT ’L L.J. 729, 731 (2004) (“[P]ursuant
to the Rome Statute, the ICC can sit regionally. Likewise, a preference could be given
to regional courts exercising universal jurisdiction, or semi-internationalized courts
could draw heavily on judges and procedures from within their own region.”).
133. See Kelly D. Askin, The Quest for Post-Conflict Gender Justice, 41 COLUM . J.
TRANSNAT ’L L. 509, 521 (2003) (“Hybrid tribunals have the advantage of including a
mixture of international and local participants redressing crimes in the state where the
crimes are committed. Thus, there is typically local ownership and participation,
resulting in an improvement in the domestic judicial system and a greater awareness
of judicial efforts by the victimized community.”).
134. See, e.g., Permanent Ct. of Arbitration (PCA), Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims
Commission: Partial Award, Central Front Ethiopia’s Claim 2, between the Fed.
Democratic Rep. of Ethiopia and the State of Eritrea 30(7) (Apr. 28, 2004), available at
http://www.asil.org/ilib/ilib0708.htm#j1 (finding liability of Ethiopia for “failing to take
effective measures to prevent rape of women by its soldiers. . . .”).
Unlike states, individuals can be held liable for both “crimes against humanity” and
“war crimes”. For definitions of the two terms, see Rome Statute, supra note 126, at
arts. 7, 8.
135. One exception is the Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, which prohibits violence against civilians including
“outrages upon personal dignity.” Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516; 75 U.N.T.S. 287, art.
3(1)(c) [hereinafter Geneva IV].
136. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13; 19 I.L.M. 33 (1980), art. 2(b), (c) (holding state parties
will “adopt appropriate legislative and other measures, including sanctions where
appropriate, prohibiting all discrimination against women; (c) To establish legal
protection of the rights of women on an equal basis with men and to ensure through
competent national tribunals and other public institutions the effective protection of
women against any act of discrimination”).
137. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171; S. Exec. Doc. E, 95-2 (1978); 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967), art. 3 (“The States Parties to the
recommendations contemplate a justice and parliamentary system
that would be sensitive to the needs of victims, while ending the
impunity that has protected perpetrators.131 Others have suggested
a regional tribunal that would draw judges from the Congo as well
as from other nations in the region.132 Such “hybrid tribunals”
combine local participation with the legitimacy of international
jurists and support.133
States can be held liable for sexual violence under the laws of
war pursuant to IHL.134 IHL applies after armed conflict has begun
and has traditionally accorded minimal attention to sexual
violence.135 International human rights law also provides protection
against sexual violence. For example, the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women136 and
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,137 both
2006] WOMEN IN POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION 29
present Covenant undertake to ensure the equal right of men and women to the
enjoyment of all civil and political rights set forth in the present Covenant.”).
138. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, G.A. Res. 48/104,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/104 (Dec. 20, 1993), art. 1 (“For the purposes of this Declaration,
the term ‘violence against women’ means any act of gender-based violence that results
in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women,
including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether
occurring in public or in private life.”).
139. By 1993, for example, one scholar was able to write, “[i]ndeed, under the weight
of the events in former Yugoslavia, the hesitation to recognize that rape can be a war
crime or a grave breach has already begun to dissipate.” Theodor Meron, Rape as a
Crime Under International Humanitarian Law, 87 AM . J. INT ’L L. 424, 426 (1993).
140. See, e.g., Bosnia-Herzegovina: Foca Verdict — Rape and Sexual Enslavement Are
Crimes Against Humanity, AMNESTY INT ’L, Feb. 22, 2001, http://web.amnesty.org/
library/Index/ENGEUR630042001?open&of=ENG-BIH (“Today’s verdict by the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia that rape and sexual
enslavement are crimes again humanity, challenges widespread acceptance that the
torture of women is an intrinsic part of war. . . .”).
141. When it comes to whether rape can constitute genocide, there are complicated
issues. Steven Ratner and Jason Abrams observe that there have been questions about
“whether rape committed in the Balkan War was genocidal, especially in light of the
hope expressed by some Serb attackers that they would make their victims give birth
to Serb babies.” STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S. AB RA M S, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LA W  42 (1998). Ratner and Abrams conclude that
the characterization will ultimately depend upon the attackers’ intent. Id. They explain:
Where an attacker rapes a victim solely as an act of vengeance or hostility
toward the victim, the rape is not genocidal, even if the attacker has
selected the victim on the basis of her religion or ethnicity. On the other
hand, if evidence suggests that the attacker committed the rape as part of
an effort to drive members of the victim’s group into conditions which the
attacker hopes will lead to their deaths, a finding of genocide becomes more
plausible.
Id. But see infra note 160 and accompanying text.
142. See AMNESTY INT ’L, IT ’S IN OUR HANDS: STOP VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN , 77
(2004), available at http://web.amnesty.org/web/web.nsf/8bad1ff50703146980256e32003
c42f0/316e14580e57b88680256ea90037305a/$FILE/SVAW%20report%20ENGLISH.pdf.
See also Rome Statute, supra note 126, at arts. 7, 8.
The changing norms of international law result, in part, from strong advocacy by
women’s groups. See, e.g., Askin, supra note 1, at 347. As Askin notes:
[I]ndefatigable efforts by . . . organizations working alongside or under the
. . . Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice in the ICC . . . that secured the
guarantee the equal rights of men and women. The United Nation’s
1993 Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women
defines gender-based violence broadly to include any gender-based
act that causes physical, sexual, or psychological harm.138
During the past decade, sexual violence against women has
begun to be recognized as a war crime,139 a crime against
humanity,140 and an instrument of genocide.141 War crimes now
include “rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced preg-
nancy, enforced sterilization and certain other forms of sexual
violence of comparable severity.”142 The first judgment issued by an
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inclusion of rape, enforced prostitution, sexual slavery, forced pregnancy,
enforced sterilization, sex trafficking, and other crimes of sexual violence
within the war crimes and crimes against humanity provisions of the ICC
Statute.
143. Prosecutor v. Jean Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Sentence (Oct. 2, 1998),
available at http://65.18.216.88/ENGLISH/cases/Akayesu/judgement/ak81002e.html
(finding Akayesu guilty of failing to stop rape as a crime against humanity by his
subordinates). Askin notes the significance of the Akayesu judgment:
The Judgement carries monumental legal significance: It concluded that
rape and other forms of sexual violence were used as instruments of
genocide, and also the crimes formed part of a widespread and systematic
attack directed against civilians, constituting crimes against humanity.
This was the first ever conviction of either genocide or crimes against
humanity for sexual violence. The Trial Chamber also articulated the
seminal definitions of rape and sexual violence under international law,
and recognized forced nudity as a form of sexual violence constituting
inhumane acts as crimes against humanity.
Askin, supra note 1, at 318.
144. See Jose E. Alvarez, Rush to Closure: Lessons of the Tadic Judgment, 96 MICH.
L. REV. 2031, 2033 (1998) (“With respect to the Balkans and Rwanda, advocates of these
prosecutions start from the premise that such trials ‘assign guilt for war crimes to the
individual perpetrators . . . rather than allowing blame to fall on entire groups and
nations.’”).
145. See Mark A. Drumbl, Punishment, Post Genocide: From Guilt to Shame, 75
N.Y.U.L. REV. 1221, 1277-78 (2000) (“[T]rials may have significant declaratory values.
Trials may set standards, codify legal principles and create precedent.”).
146. As Hilary Charlesworth explains:
The emphasis on the harm to the Tutsi people as a whole is, of course,
required by the international definition of genocide, and the Akayesu
decision on this point simply illustrates the inability of the law to properly
name what is at stake: rape is wrong, not because it is a crime of violence
against women and a manifestation of male dominance, but because it is
an assault on a community defined only by its racial, religious, national or
ethnic composition.
Charlesworth, supra note 2, at 387 (internal citations omitted).
international tribunal recognizing rape as a war crime occurred in
the monumental case against Jean-Paul Akayesu, a former mayor
in Rwanda by the ITCR.143 International tribunals like the ICTR
serve to place blame at the individual rather than the collective
level.144 Such trials can also serve to dramatically illustrate that
there is no impunity for sexual violence.145 Nonetheless, such
tribunals operate with a significant limitation; under international
law, rape can only be prosecuted when it can be connected with the
intention of assaulting a community.146
C. Additional Means of Justice
In the United States, advocates have succeeded in strengthen-
ing rape laws over the past twenty-five years by, for example,
abolishing the exceptions for marital rape, enacting rape shield
2006] WOMEN IN POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION 31
147. Mary P. Koss et al., Restorative Justice for Sexual Violence: Repairing Victims,
Building Community, and Holding Offenders Accountable, in SEXUALLY COERCIVE
BEHAVIOR: UNDERSTANDING AND MANAGEMENT 384, 387 (Robert A. Prentky et al. eds.,
2003).
148. Id. Similar efforts in the domestic violence context have had little impact on
lowering its prevalence as well. See Hopkins et al., supra note 24, at 310.
149. See, e.g., Owen D. Jones, Sex, Culture, and the Biology of Rape: Toward
Explanation and Prevention, 87 CAL. L. REV. 827, 840 (1999).
150. Martha Minow, Memory and Hate: Are There Lessons from Around the World?,
in BREAKING THE CYCLES OF HATRED: MEMORY , LAW , AND REPA IR 2 (Nancy Rosenblum
& Martha Minow eds., 2002) (“[T]he tribunals and their work offer rituals of
accountability, defying impunity and public acknowledgment, defying forced forgetting.
International tribunals . . . also remind bystanders to take action to prevent the
circumstances in which tyrants mobilize ordinary people to destroy others.”).
151. In the United States, women’s issues typically have been considered private
matters. See Naomi Cahn, Family Law, Federalism, and the Federal Courts, 79 IO W A
L. REV. 1073, 1100 (1994).
152. U.S. INST. OF PEACE, RETHINKING TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION:
LESSONS F RO M  SIERRA LEONE 1 (2005), available at http://www.usip.org/pubs/special
reports/sr130.pdf.
153. Zambia, Botswana, South Africa, Namibia, and Zimbabwe all have their penal
codes concerning rape drawn from British colonial law. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
MORE THAN A NA M E: STATE-SPONSORED HOMOPHOBIA AND ITS CON SEQ UEN CES  IN
laws, and increasing the sentences for rapists.147 Yet these reforms
have had limited impact on the rates of rape reporting, prosecution,
or conviction.148 As advocates have come to realize, one of the most
important factors in impacting rape prevalence is the cultural
attitudes which the community holds toward rape.149 This state-
ment is also true in the international arena. Although international
criminal tribunals do not necessarily deter future crimes, they help
shape cultural attitudes by holding perpetrators accountable and by
serving as a vivid reminder of the conflict’s destruction.150
The purpose of employing an international tribunal is designed
to result in national and international attention and public
accountability, rather than treating sexual violence as a more
private matter to be resolved locally.151 Some international instru-
ments, such as truth and reconciliation commissions, also have the
advantage of healing a nation without prosecution, the so-called
“forgive and forget” approach.152
D. The Need for Domestic Reforms Regarding Women’s Rights
and Status
This section focuses on domestic rape law, using, as an
example, the rape law of the DRC. Many third world nations
emerging from conflict retain criminal codes modeled on colonial
law.153 In these societies, as in the DRC, domestic rape law is
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SOUTHERN AFRICA 281 (2003), available at http://hrw.org/reports/2003/safrica/safriglhrc
0303.pdf (“Laws against rape are a major social and political issue in southern Africa,
amid the burgeoning incidence of sexual violence in the region. Colonial law gave
successor states a heritage of laws with inexact definitions and inappropriate scope,
which have provided only limited tools to counter the crisis.”) [hereinafter MORE THAN
A NA M E].
Pakistan’s criminal code is largely retained from its colonial period, for example. See
HUMAN  RIGHTS WATCH, PRISON BOUND: THE DENIAL OF JUVENILE JUSTICE IN PAKISTAN
ch. I (1999), http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/pakistan2/ (“A legacy of British colonial
administration . . . , the jirgas [tribal courts] conduct trials without regard to due
process guarantees, such as the right to retain counsel, present evidence, or cross-
examine witnesses.”). Bangladesh and India also have penal codes against
homosexuality originating from the British colonial law. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH ,
RAVAGING THE VULNERABLE: ABUSES AGAINST PERSONS AT HIGH RISK OF HIV  INFECTION
IN BANGLADESH 38 (2003), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/bangladesh
0803/bangladesh0803.pdf(“An old colonial law against ‘carnal intercourse’ is interpreted
to criminalize men who have sex with men.”).
154. CONFRONTING IMPUNITY, supra note 130, at 7-8 (“The situation in the DRC is
particularly complicated as the rape law excludes a number of sexual and other gender-
based crimes that have frequently occurred in the DRC, for example bodily penetration
with an object.”). See also MORE THAN A NA M E, supra note 153, at 185 (noting that in
South Africa “rape is defined as non-consensual penetration of a vagina by a penis.
Other forms of rape . . . would be charged only as ‘indecent assault,’ which carries a
lower penalty”).
By contrast, the Netherlands is often cited for its exemplary rape law. Section 242 of
the Dutch Criminal Code provides:
He who by means of violence or another fact or by threats with violence
or another act compels another person to undergo acts consisting or
including sexual penetration of the body, will be punished as guilty of rape
with imprisonment of twelve years as a maximum or a fine of the fifth
category.
Wetboek van Strafrecht (Criminal Code) § 242 SR (Neth.), available at http://www.
actumail.nl/sexoffense.htm.
155. MASS RAPE, supra note 104, at 16 (“Moreover, the rape of a man is not included
in the legal definition of rape. Congolese law describes forced anal sex by one man on
another man as indecent assault and not rape.”).
inadequate as it defines rape narrowly and fails to cover vaginal
penetration other than by a penis.154 Nor do the definitions of rape
usually cover anal penetration of a man.155
Formulating a model rape statute for post conflict countries
requires provisions covering the crime of rape when it occurs both
within and outside the conflict setting. As the country moves
forward, it should redefine rape law so that it accomplishes the
three goals of criminalizing conflict conduct, deterring and punish-
ing prospective rapes, and promoting gender equity.
1. Developing a Model Statute
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156. WOMEN  FOR WOMEN INT ’L, RAPE IN WAR, http://www.womenforwomen.org/
rarrape.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2006). Nonetheless, like the ICTY and the ICC,
because of its jurisdictional mandates, the ICTR’s statute’s references to rape are
limited to listing rape as a crime against humanity and/or a war crime.
157. Prosecutor v. Jean Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 598 (Sept.
2, 1998), available at http://65.18.216.88/default.htm.
Of particular significance is the ICTR’s finding that the systematic rape of Tutsi
women in Rwanda constituted genocide. Id. at ¶ 731 (“These rapes resulted in physical
and psychological destruction of Tutsi women, their families and their communities.
Sexual violence was an integral part of the process of destruction, specifically targeting
Tutsi women and specifically contributing to their destruction and to the destruction
of the Tutsi group as a whole.”).
158. Id. at ¶ 596.
159. Although the prosecution “submitted a documentation . . . finding that ‘Zejnel
Delalic had control over the Celebici camp and was responsible for everything that went
on in that camp’ he was acquitted of all charges.” Vera Raskov, Delalic’s Acquittal
Closes the Path to Izetbegovic, SERB IAINFO, Jan. 25, 1999, http://www.serbia-info.com/
news/1999-01/25/8405.html. See also Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalic (a/k/a “Pavo”), Case No.
IT-96-21-A, Judgment, Procedural Background, Feb. 20, 2001, available at http://www.
un.org/icty/Supplement/supp23-e/index.htm (“The Trial Chamber found Zejnil Delalic
not guilty on all counts on the ground that he did not have sufficient command and
control over the Celebici prison-camp and its guards to be found criminally responsible
as a superior for the crimes they committed in the camp.”).
160. Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-A, at ¶ 488 (“Against this background
the Court is satisfied that the accumulation of acts of physical and mental violence
inflicted on the applicant and the especially cruel act of rape to which she was subjected
amounted to torture in breach of article 3 of the Convention.”).
In developing a model statute, one would do well to look to the
ICTR, as it has provided the widest definition of rape in interna-
tional law.156 In Akayesu, the ICTR defined rape as:
[A] physical invasion of a sexual nature, committed on a person
under circumstances which are coercive. Sexual violence which
includes rape, is considered to be any act of a sexual nature
which is committed on a person under circumstances which are
coercive. This act must be committed: (a) as part of a wide
spread or systematic attack; (b) on a civilian population; (c) on
certained catalogued discriminatory grounds, namely: national,
ethnic, political, racial, or religious grounds.157
The ICTR further clarified rape to include “acts which involve
the insertion of objects and or the use of bodily orifices not consid-
ered to be intrinsically sexual.”158
Similarly, the ICTY used broad language to describe rape in
Prosecutor v. Delalic, in which a Serbian prison camp guard was
charged with failing to prevent subordinates from committing war
crimes.159 The ICTY expressed agreement with the ICTR’s reason-
ing that rape is a form of both physical and mental violence and in
the case at bar, constituted torture.160
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161. See generally SEEKING JUSTICE, supra note 31.
162. Id. at 8-9.
163. Newly drafted criminal codes should be expanded to include different forms of
sexual violence. For example, three provisions could be added to the Congolese Criminal
Code. First, the code must be broadened to cover the insertion of objects into anyone
else’s vagina, anus, or mouth. See id. at 29. Second, Congolese rape law currently allows
the victim’s “loose morals” to be considered in the determination of whether a criminal
act has been perpetrated. See id. The code should be revised to include a Congolese rape
shield law. Third, the code should criminalize marital rape. In neighboring Uganda for
example, women’s groups have recently been advocating for enactment of a new
Domestic Relations bill, which would criminalize marital rape. See HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, UGANDA: DOMESTIC RELATIONS BILL WOULD SAVE LIVES, http://hrw.org/english/
docs/2005/05/31/uganda11051.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2006).
164. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
165. SEEKING JUSTICE, supra note 31, at 27 (quoting Code Zaïrois de la Famille, arts.
444, 448, and 454).
2. Changing Existing Law
As countries transition from conflict to peace, sexual violence
may continue. For example, the systematic sexual abuse of
Congolese women continues.161 One NGO reported that in October
2004, eight to ten women were raped daily in Bunia, the main city
in the resource-rich Ituri province.162 Drastically reducing the crime
of sexual violence in post conflict countries takes more than merely
revising the criminal code.163 As rape advocates in the United States
have learned, equally as important as revising the law is changing
the cultural attitudes a community has toward rape.164 Until
women emerge from the second class status they have been forced
to assume in the DRC, the most progressive rape laws in the world
will not stop sexual violence against women there. As Human
Rights Watch explained in a report on sexual violence in the DRC:
The inadequacies of the rape law reflect traditional notions
of rape, especially the weak legal and social status of women in
Congo. This second-class status of women is reflected through-
out Congolese law. For instance, the Congolese Family Code
defines the husband as the head of the household and requires
his wife to obey him. The women also has to move wherever the
husband chooses to live, and has to seek her husband’s authori-
zation to go to court. These laws violate international standards
of equality between women and men.165
Broadly, two sets of interrelated strategies can be used to
change the social and cultural climate in a country to improve
governance and responsiveness to gender. First, multilateral
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166. The World Bank recently noted, “most lessons and best practices are derived
from international judicial bodies and conventions.” BOUTA ET AL., supra note 16, at 87.
Although it is true that international conventions and courts have developed substantial
expertise in the context of integrating gender into accountability, indigenous
organizations should not be overlooked as they have developed their own models that
are locally-sensitive.
167. Susan Hirsch, The Power of Participation: Language and Gender in Tanzanian
Law Reform Campaigns, 49 AFRICA TODAY 51, 73 n.1 (2002).
168. Numerous organizations, such as Synergie des Femmes pour les Victimes des
Violences Sexuelles, Coalition Contre Les Violences Sexuelles en Republique
Democratique du Congo, and Global Rights (formerly the International Human Rights
Law Group) are involved in this issue.
169. Given that the Congo is already a party to the relevant international
conventions, these laws simply would conform domestic law to these instruments.
170. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HELP FOR THE VIC TIM S n.164 (2005), http://hrw.
org/reports/2005/drc0305/8.htm#_ftn164 (last visited Jan. 16, 2006) (“In Congo, abortion
is outlawed except when a doctor considers that the pregnancy could be fatal for the
mother.”).
171. SEEKING JUSTICE, supra note 31, at 5 (“[T]he Congolese Criminal Code [fails] to
provide specific protective measures to victims of crimes of sexual violence, such as
ensuring confidentiality of victims and witnesses”).
institutions, bilateral aid agencies, and NGOs can exert pressure on
the national government. Second, indigenous NGOs, individuals,
and responsible governmental officials can pressure institutions
from within the country (often with external support). Although
international organizations have a wealth of comparative experi-
ences for potential models, indigenous organizations have greater
expertise with local models and with developing programs that
work within their communities.166
As the Congo is currently undergoing a complex post conflict
reconstruction and attempting the difficult transition to a viable
democracy, there are multiple opportunities for changing the legal
system. Democratization projects typically involve improving civil
society organizations, creating public consciousness about democ-
racy, and developing the electoral process.167 Various NGOs have
also organized workshops to discuss legal reform, involving civil
society institutions, human rights organizations, and representa-
tives from local and national government.168 As a result, the DRC
legislature has before it various suggestions that would conform the
Congolese penal code to international law on war crimes and
rape.169 Much of the legal reform is focused on ending impunity for
perpetrators, but reforms that would help victims include improv-
ing their status as full citizens, legalizing abortions (at a minimum
for cases of rape),170 and protecting the confidentiality of informa-
tion that survivors provide to medical and psychological care
providers.171
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172. See supra note 56.
173. GLOBAL ISSUES, GEOP OLIT ICS, CONFLICTS IN AFRICA, DRC, http://www.global
issues.org/Geopolitics/Africa/DRC.asp (last visited Jan. 16, 2006).
174. The type of counseling will vary; some women will not want any while others will
only be comfortable with a more traditional practice. As Beth Vann warns, “Western
talk-therapy models of counseling are unfamiliar to clients in most displaced
communities, and the appropriateness of using this type of service should be carefully
examined.” BETH VANN, REPROD. HEALTH FOR REFUGEES CONSORTIUM , GENDER-BASED
VIOLENCE: EMERGING ISSUES IN PROGRAM S SERVING DISPLACED POPULATIONS 72 (2002),
available at http://www.rhrc.org/pdf/gbv_vann.pdf.
The author has visited centers for street children in Kinshasa, Congo, which have
little artwork except for a poster on avoiding pregnancy. Similar posters could be
developed on sexual violence. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, POLICY PARA LYS IS: A
CALL FOR ACTION ON HIV/AIDS-RELATED HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AGAINST WOMEN AND
GIRLS IN AFRICA 86 (2003), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/africa1203/
africa1203.pdf [hereinafter POLICY PARA LYS IS] (stressing “nationwide awareness
campaigns” to “ensure basic protection against sexual violence and abuse”).
175. See, e.g., AMNESTY INT ’L, WOMEN ’S RIGHTS ARE HUMAN RIGHTS THE STRUGGLE
PERSISTS: KNOW YOUR RIGHTS, http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/intcam/women/2000/rights.
html (last visited Jan. 16, 2006); WOMEN ’S AID ORG., KN O W  YOUR RIGHTS: RIGHT TO
VOTE, http://www.wao.org.my/news/20030101knowrghts_vote.htm (last visited Jan. 16,
2006).
3. Implementation
After a law on sexual violence has been changed, community
education becomes critical to informing victims about their new
rights and remedies. Encouraging victims to explore formal justice
proceedings requires that they have sufficient information about
the adjudicatory process and their role in that process, and that the
law criminalizes the implicated behavior. In a country such as the
DRC, where the adult illiteracy rate is approximately forty-five
percent for women,172 and forty percent of school-age children do not
attend primary school,173 written materials must be supplemented
with counseling and media broadcasts. In such an effort, churches
can be used to disseminate materials, information can be provided
in birthing centers, and peer-to-peer counseling can be employed in
educating women about their new rights.174 Several NGOs have also
developed “know your rights” campaigns, which provide information
about what women can do to report crimes and seek justice.175
a. Gender-Sensitive Support
Providing funding to legal clinics and establishing safe houses
will also increase the utility of newly-enacted laws on sexual
violence. In an innovative program, the World Bank supported legal
aid clinics for poor women in Ecuador as part of a larger project to
2006] WOMEN IN POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION 37
176. THE WORLD BANK , IMPACT OF LEGAL AID: ECUADOR x (2003), available at
http://www4.worldbank.org/legal/publications/LegalAid.pdf.
177. Bruce M. Owen & Jorge Portillo, Legal Reform, Externalities and Economic
Development: Measuring the Impact of Legal Aid on Poor Women in Ecuador 26, 28, 39,
44 (Stanford Inst. for Econ. Policy Research, Discussion Paper No. 02-32, 2003),
available at http://scid.stanford.edu/events/Bruce%20Paper.pdf. The five-year judicial
reform project cost $10.6 million and the three legal clinics received $400,000 over a
four-year period. Id. at 9.
178. Id. at 26, 47.
179. Id. at 47, 49.
180. POLICY PARA LYS IS, supra note 174, at 64.
reform the judicial system.176 The project evaluation showed that in
comparison to a comparable sample of non-clients, women who had
received representation through the clinics were more likely to
receive child support awards, were less likely to experience severe
domestic violence after separation, were more likely to send their
children to school, and were more likely to view the judicial system
positively.177 In focus groups, women explained that the primary
obstacle to using the legal system were their perceptions that it was
costly, corrupt, discriminatory, and not transparent.178 The legal aid
clinic, however, empowered them to face the system, and clients
experienced an increased sense of self-worth as a result of their
access to the legal system.179
As many women also need protection from their abusers before,
during, and after their experiences with the legal system, safe
houses also become a necessity. They need not be formal structures,
as they are in the United States, but could take the form of
protection by a trusted member of the community or coordinating
the housing situations of several women so that they can live
together.
b. Gender-Sensitive Policies Within the Legal System
Even if rape laws are rewritten, the national justice system is
entirely restructured, and women have the courage to use the
system, there are still a series of reforms that must be implemented
so as to ensure that the legal system is capable of handling such
cases. The most basic requirement is development of policies and
protocols on gender-based violence crimes. First, judges and court
staff will need training on issues of sexual violence to include the
psychological implications of the crimes.180
Second, victims and witnesses will need to feel a sense of
security heretofore lacking. Their identities must be protected from
the public, and they may require special security needs such as safe
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181. These safe houses would be comparable to battered women’s shelters, providing
shelter, food, and support in a confidential location.
182. JEFFERSON, supra note 117.
183. Id.
184. WAR WITHIN THE WAR, supra note 111, at 81-82. Several U.S. states, for
example, have rape shield statutes that require hearings on possible inadmissible
evidence (such as sexual history) to be held in camera, away from the press and the
public. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-407(2)(c) (2005).
185. See, e.g., Askin, supra note 133, at 517-18.
186. HUMAN  RIGHTS WATCH, SHATTERED LIVES: SEXUAL VIOLENCE DURING THE
RWANDAN  GENOCIDE AND ITS AFTERMATH 4 (1996), http://hrw.org/reports/1996/Rwanda.
htm (“Many women interviewed by our team, composed solely of women, indicated that
they would report rape to a female investigator, but not to a man.”).
187. See Wood, supra note 99, at 318.
188. CONFRONTING IMPUNITY, supra note 130, at 8 (“Forming a mobile investigative
unit would be a discrete measure that could be undertaken relatively quickly. It would
represent a significant step forward in delivering justice for the most serious crimes
under international law.”).
Some activists have gone further than mobile investigative units to suggest mobile
courts, which would render judgments on site. See, e.g., Zoom. . . Mobile Courts in DR
Congo, AVOCATS SANS FRONTIÈRES (Newsletter 2005-I), Jan. 2005, available at
http://www.asf.be/EN/ENnews/Newsletter_2004_VII_EN.htm. Other organizations have
expressed concerns with such courts. As Pratt and Werchick note for example:
Members of the international community have discussed the idea of
“mobile courts” to fill the gap in the judiciary process. But interviewees in
the eastern provinces felt strongly felt [sic] that such an approach would
be inadvisable. First, without added long-term security measures, it would
houses to ensure their physical safety.181 After some rape survivors
offered testimony to the ICTR, for example, they received anony-
mous threats and other forms of harassment upon returning
home.182 In some cases they even learned that members of their
community (in some cases the perpetrators themselves) had
detailed reports of their testimony.183 Post conflict laws, therefore,
should include comparable provisions to rape shield laws protecting
witnesses or safeguarding confidentiality.184
Third, judicial systems should also recruit more women as
investigators, prosecutors, and judges as many women from
traditional societies may feel uncomfortable discussing sexual
violence with a man.185 Women will not necessarily be better than
men in hearing and investigating these cases, but gender balance
may make victims feel more comfortable in reporting and discuss-
ing the violence and may provide alternative perspectives.186
Indeed, survivors of the Rwandan genocide have reported that they
would have been more likely to discuss the violence perpetrated
against them had the investigations been conducted by women.187
Finally, mobile investigative units could collect evidence at the
victim’s location and could begin operating more quickly than
formally established prosecutors’ offices.188 So long as the units did
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create risks for reprisals when the court leaves. Second, there would be a
risk of “mobile” judgments not being accepted by traditional leaders. Last,
judgments would risk being overturned when a new national justice system
finally is put in place.
PRATT & WERCHICK, supra note 113, at 18.
189. See, e.g., PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, U.S. DEP ’T OF JUSTICE, FULL
REPORT OF THE PREVALENCE, INCIDENCE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN  (2000), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/181867.pdf. See also Mary
P. Koss, Blame, Shame, and Community: Justice Responses to Violence Against Women,
55 AM . PSYCHOL. 3, 5 (2000), available at http://restoreprogram.publichealth.arizona.
edu/research/Koss%202000%20Blame,%20Shame,%20and%20Community.pdf (“Official
justice department estimates put the reporting rate at 36%.”).
190. See MASS RAPE, supra note 104, at 36-37.
191. See MINOW, supra note 35, at 121 (“[I]f the longer term goals include avoiding
cycles of revenge, social reintegration of at least lower-level perpetrators should be
pursued. In many circumstances, demonizing all on ‘that side’ means demonizing large
segments of the society. . . .”).
Mark Drumbl eloquently notes the dilemma:
Assuming that it is the act of deliberation that generates national
reconciliation, the question arises whether adversarial trials constitute the
most effective vehicle for encouraging deliberation. If trials target a select
few individuals (the approach of the ICTR), then they may be logistically
feasible, but the deliberations may be too contained; if trials target a large
number of individuals (the approach of the Rwandan domestic
proceedings), then they may be infeasible logistically and result in massive
incapacitation.
Drumbl, supra note 145, at 1280.
not violate the victims’ confidentiality and did not lead perpetrators
to believe that the departure of the team implied the departure of
accountability, mobile teams could help establish a base for
prosecutions and provide visible evidence of change in prosecuting
procedures.
4. What Difference Does It Make: Why Change Domestic Rape
Laws?
Even in the United States, rape victims are often reluctant to
pursue litigation.189 The difficulties of prosecuting a rape case in a
the United States, where there are functioning police departments
and forensic units, are magnified in a country without these
resources.190 Even if local courts are capable of prosecuting rape
trials, retributive justice may not always be the best solution, as it
makes resettlement and reintegration more difficult.191
Moreover, domestic law covers individual crimes, rather than
crimes against humanity. Prosecuting specific individuals for
specific acts does not encompass and publicize the systematic
nature and the gravity of the crimes committed. In many cases it
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192. See FEDERICO BORELLO, INT ’L CTR. FOR TRANSNATIONAL JUSTICE, A FIRST FEW
STEPS: THE LONG ROAD TO A JUST PEACE IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO iv
(2004), available at http://www.ictj.org/downloads/ICTJ.DRC.Eng.pdf.
193. Id. at 21.
194. Evidence in the U.S. on the impact of rape law reform is ambiguous; however,
some studies show an increase in reporting and arrest resulting from liberalization of
rape laws. See, e.g., Stacy Futter & Walter R. Mebane, Jr., The Effects of Rape Law
Reform on Rape Case Processing, 16 BERKELEY WOMEN ’S L.J. 72, 83-85 (2001). Contra
Ilene Seidman & Susan Vickers, The Second Wave: An Agenda for the Next Thirty Years
of Law Reform, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 467, 467-68 (2005) (“Few commentators can point
to any data suggesting that criminal rape reform laws have deterred the commission
of rape, increased its prosecution, or increased conviction rates.”).
195. See MASS RAPE, supra note 104, at 36-37. In detailing the extraordinary
inadequacies of the Congolese judicial system, the report goes on to note:
In most provinces, civil courts do not function properly, and in many areas
there are no judicial personnel, lawyers, civilian police officers or
detectives. Judicial institutions are starved of financial resources and even
of basic legal texts, including national legal codes. Judicial personnel have
not been paid for several years and have no incentive to carry out their
duties. Magistrates have rarely had any training in international law and
human rights. Office materials and stationery are in short supply and
buildings, including prisons and detention facilities, are dilapidated. . . .
The judiciary is widely unindependent throughout the country, controlled
or influenced by the political and military authorities, including the de
facto authority of armed groups.
Id. at 37.
196. BORELLO, supra note 192, at 27.
may also be impossible to convict high-level commanders based on
command responsibility.192
Notwithstanding these problems, domestic rape law remains
useful for holding both low-level commanders and individual
combatants who committed crimes of sexual violence accountable.
Very few ex-combatants will be prosecuted by an international
court, which must, based on limited resources, focus on the most
egregious and widespread actors. Consequently, strong domestic
rape law for wartime rape can be useful in prosecuting such
individuals.193 Even more importantly in the post conflict context,
strengthening rape laws is one step towards gender equity and may
encourage more women to report rapes committed against them.194
Amnesty International has characterized the eastern half of the
Congo as “a widely lawless region, characterized by the almost total
degeneration of the Congolese judicial system.”195 Nonetheless, the
same report notes that the international community, particularly
the EU, has helped restore judicial capacity in Bunia, one of the
towns at the center of conflict in the Eastern Congo.196 As a result
of such support, by the end of the summer of 2004, the judiciary had
begun investigations in 440 cases and issued judgments in 42
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197. Id.
198. Id. at 28 (“Victims and witnesses are reluctant to testify even in ordinary crime
cases, let alone in serious human rights violations involving powerful militia members.
Retaliation is a concrete possibility (some even say probability). . . .”).
199. See, e.g., Tigist Hailu, Formal and Informal Responses to the Recurring Forms
of Violence Against Women in Ethiopia, http://www.preventgbvafrica.org/images/
publications/research/vawethiopia.hailu.pdf (last visited Jan. 14, 2006).
200. Id. (“In the first place cases of abduction and rape are wrongly perceived as cases
affecting family honour and public moral. Their deadly effects on the well being of the
female victim are not clearly recognized.”).
201. As Abby Morrow Richardson notes, “[l]aws are only effective if enforced;
enforcement is possible only with understanding and acceptance; and respect for the
law is secured only when the people believe in its necessity.” Abby Morrow Richardson,
Women’s Inheritance Rights in Africa: The Need to Integrate Cultural Understanding
and Legal Reform, 11 HUM . RTS. BRIEF 19, 22 (2004).
Some of the newer approaches to justice, namely restorative justice and social
services justice, also emphasize the importance of transforming the culture. For an
explanation of each of these approaches, see Cahn, supra note 21, at 242-49.
202. While French is the official language of the DRC, for example, national
languages include Lingala, Swahili, Kikongo, and Tshiluba. BACKGROUND NOTE: DRC,
supra note 67.
203. For example, the Congo is one of the major epicenters for sub-Saharan Africa’s
popular music. See, e.g., Rumba in the Jungle, THE ECONOM IST, Dec. 18, 2003,
http://www.economist.com/world/africa/PrinterFriendly.cfm?story_id=2281725
(describing the importance of Congolese music to the war-ravaged citizens of the DRC).
cases.197 The major challenge in Bunia, and elsewhere, remains the
grossly inadequate security situation.198
E. Rape Laws and Gender Equity
Calls to reform the cultural tolerance and law of rape may
conflict with traditional practices and challenge historical views of
women. Customary law practices such as a rape perpetrator paying
the victim’s family honor damage or marrying the victim remains
strong in many sub-Saharan Africa.199 Such practices stem from a
belief that rape is a crime committed against a family’s honor
rather than against the victim.200 If new rape laws are to prove
effective, cultural understandings such as these must be changed.201
Governmental entities and NGOs have the ability of changing
culture through a variety of mechanisms. First, the government
must ensure that the new laws are widely distributed and trans-
lated into the different languages of the country.202 Second, church
groups and other civil society institutions can provide information
and counseling, as well as legal support. Third, popular culture,
including music and street theater, is extremely persuasive in
influencing attitudes, and should be enlisted in changing sexist
cultural values.203
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204. See, e.g., GA RD A M & JARV IS, supra note 33, at 253.
205. See Jeanmarie Fenrich & Tracy E. Higgins, Promise Unfulfilled: Law, Culture,
and Women’s Inheritance Rights in Ghana, 25 FOR D HA M  INT ’L L.J. 259 (2001);
Richardson, supra note 201, at 22; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WOMEN ’S PROPERTY RIGHTS,
VIOLATIONS DO O M  EQUALITY AND DEVELOPMENT, http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/women/
property/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2006).
Revising the laws on rape and changing the cultural tolerance
for sexual violence against women is, however, only part of the
necessary reforms to improve women’s status in post conflict
societies. The focus on sexual violence against women cannot
diminish the significance of other aspects of women’s status and of
the consequences of armed conflict for women.204 For example, rape
law reform (apart from the criminalization of marital rape) does not
address the somewhat related problems of civil and criminal
responses to domestic violence. Other legal reforms involve
guaranteeing women’s rights to housing, holding and inheriting
land, and financial credit.205
CONCLUSION
This article seeks to broaden our concept of post conflict justice
to make gender central in the planning and execution of programs.
Post conflict justice must include the centrality of gender in all post
conflict activities, including punishment for past wrongs, demilita-
rizing society, and designing the justice system to ensure not just
formal gender equality but also the removal of cultural and legal
barriers to women’s full exercise of their rights.
Making gender central can be accomplished through a combina-
tion of gender mainstreaming, women-focused activities, or gender
equality promotion activities. As countries seek to redevelop after
conflict, the centrality of gender can be justified on an economic,
social, psychological, or legal basis.
This centrality requires reconceptualizing disarmament,
demobilization, and resettlement (DDR) programs so that they are
integrated with democracy promotion, gender equality, and
economic and social development.
